What is a DSO?

Published by European Distribution System Operators (E.DSO), Why smart grids?
Website: edsoforsmartgrids.eu


Distribution system operators (DSOs) are the operating managers (and sometimes owners) of energy distribution networks, operating at low, medium and, in some member states, high voltage levels (LV, MV). Transmission grids transport large quantities of high (and extreme high) voltage (HV, EHV) electricity across vast distances, often from large power plants to the outskirts of large cities or industrial zones, where it is transformed into lower voltages distributed to all end-users through the distribution network. Over-head and underground cables leading to your home or business are operated by DSOs.

Traditionally, energy systems from power generation to homes are one-directional and based on more predictable, controllable and centralised power generation, looking something like this:

Image by E.DSO – Grids Before

Increasingly, more energy is being generated locally and connected directly to distribution networks, from solar panels on your roof, to small power plants. This is generally referred to by DSOs as distributed energy resources (DER) and in the specific case of renewables, distributed renewable energy sources (DRES).

EU policy driving the need for smart grids

Since 2007, the European Union has committed to reaching the so-called 20-20-20 targets. By 2020, the EU will reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 20% compared to 1990 levels, produce 20% of the energy consumed from renewable energy sources (RES), and will have consumed 20% less energy. Beyond 2020, the EU expects to cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 85-90% by 2050 and plans to set intermediate targets for 2030.

For such objectives to be achieved, an ever increasing share of RES is being connected to our electricity networks. Electricity generated from renewable sources is predominantly variable in nature (wind and solar) and is connected to distribution networks, making the DSO’s core mission of providing a secure electricity supply and quality of service increasingly challenging.

To add to the changing nature of the energy supply are new forms of energy demand, such as electric vehicles (EV).

The changing energy scenario in Europe requires a dramatic re-thinking of how to keep the lights on while both making the best use of new energy sources and keeping infrastructure costs down. Instead of only extending / reinforcing physical infrastructure, which is extremely costly and disruptive to local communities, complementary IT solutions are being introduced, adding communication, sensors and automation allowing DSOs to actively manage the varying generation and demand. This combination of solutions is what is commonly referred to as a smart grid.

Instead of the one-directional system shown above, distribution networks are starting to look more like this:

Image by E.DSO – Grids Now

The core responsibilities of DSOs, security of supply and quality of service, remain the same, but to continue to ensure these, DSOs are having to evolve, becoming increasingly active network managers. For this, DSOs need a larger toolbox and adapted legislative and regulatory frameworks.

Smart grids are still in their infancy but will be key-enablers of other technological developments. These and other relatively new technologies, such as smart metering and energy storage, are being tested on a large scale and in real-life scenarios and have, in some EU member states, even been deployed.

More information on the EU smart grid related policy can be found on E.DSO’s Policy page.


Source URL: https://www.edsoforsmartgrids.eu/home/why-smart-grids/

General Reference – Wiring and Grounding

Published by Electrotek Concepts, Inc., PQSoft Case Study: General Reference – Wiring and Grounding, Document ID: PQS0609, Date: July 1, 2006.


Abstract: Wiring and grounding problems are responsible for many power quality variations within customer facilities. Some electric utility engineers have estimated that 80% of all the power quality problems reported by customers are found to be due to their own wiring and grounding problems. While end-users may have a different opinion, it is commonplace for many power quality problems to be resolved by simply tightening a loose connection, removing an unnecessary ground connection, bonding ground conductors, or replacing a corroded conductor. Therefore, the first step in any power quality investigation is to evaluate the wiring and grounding practices of the facility.

This case provides general information on proper grounding practices and outlines common problems that are encountered.

INTRODUCTION

This case describes a general review of wiring and grounding with respect to power quality. Wiring and grounding problems are responsible for many power quality variations within customer facilities. Some electric utility engineers have estimated that 80% of all the power quality problems reported by customers are found to be due to their own wiring and grounding problems. While end-users may have a different opinion, it is commonplace for many power quality problems to be resolved by simply tightening a loose connection, removing an unnecessary ground connection, bonding ground conductors, or replacing a corroded conductor. Therefore, the first step in any power quality investigation is to evaluate the wiring and grounding practices of the facility.

IEEE wiring regulations and other important standards provide the minimum standards for wiring and grounding. These work well at 60Hz, or power frequency. However, it is often necessary to go beyond the minimum requirements of safety standards to achieve a system that also minimizes the impact on connected equipment of power quality variations that have higher frequency components.

REASONS FOR GROUNDING

Personnel Safety
Personnel safety is the primary reason that all equipment must have a safety equipment ground. This is designed to prevent the possibility of high touch voltages when there is a fault in a piece of equipment (see Figure 1). The touch voltage is the voltage between any two conducting surfaces that can be simultaneously touched by an individual. The earth may be one of these surfaces.

There should be no “floating” panels or enclosures near electric circuits. In the event of insulation failure or inadvertent application of moisture, any electric charge that appears on a panel, enclosure, or raceway must be drained to “ground” or to an object that is reliably grounded.

Figure 1 – High Touch Voltage due to Improper Grounding

Grounding to Assure Protective Device Operation
A ground fault return path to the point where the power source neutral conductor is grounded is an essential safety feature. The NEC and some local wiring codes permit electrically continuous conduit and wiring device enclosures to serve as this ground return path. Some codes require the conduit to be supplemented with a bare or insulated conductor included with the other power conductors.

An insulation failure or other fault that allows a phase wire to make contact with an enclosure will find a low impedance path back to the power source neutral. The resulting overcurrent will cause the circuit breaker or fuse to disconnect the faulted circuit promptly. NEC, Article 250-51 states that an Effective Grounding Path (the path to ground from circuits, equipment, and conductor enclosures) shall:

  • Be permanent and continuous.
  • Have capacity to conduct safely any fault current likely to be imposed on it.
  • Have sufficiently low impedance to limit the voltage to ground and to facilitate the operation of the circuit protective devices in the circuit.
  • The earth shall not be used as the sole equipment ground conductor.

Noise Control
This is where grounding relates to power quality. The safety reasons for grounding described above are not related to power quality concerns. However, they define the minimum requirements for a grounding system. Anything that is done to the grounding system to improve the noise performance must be done in addition to the minimum requirements defined in the National Electric Code and local codes.

The primary objective of grounding for noise control is to create an equipotential ground system. Potential differences between different ground locations can create circulating ground currents and interference with sensitive equipment that may be grounded in multiple locations. Steady state circulating currents and associated potential differences will be at 60 Hz or at harmonic frequencies and are caused by potential differences at the main ground locations of the two facilities. Transient potential differences will be caused by switching events or lightning surges that cause ground currents or protective device operation from line-to-ground.

Ground Voltage Equalization of voltage differences between parts of an Automated Data Processing (ADP) grounding system is accomplished in part when the equipment grounding conductors are connected to the grounding point of a single power source. However, if the equipment grounding conductors are long, and if the ground currents are significant, the impedance of grounding conductors may be too high to achieve a constant potential throughout the grounding system. Supplementary conductors that may be needed for improving power quality must be in addition to the equipment ground conductors that are required for safety and not a replacement for them.

Often, selection of proper size grounding conductors and assuring good ground connections is sufficient to achieve an equipotential ground system. However, with higher speed communication and processing, the high frequency characteristics of the ground system can also be important. A Signal Reference Grid (see Figure 2), or Zero Reference Grid as used in IEEE Std. 1100, can provide an equipotential reference over a wide frequency range for computers and data processing equipment. This type of configuration is most common in mainframe computer installations.

Figure 2 – Use of a Signal Reference Grid
PROPER GROUNDING PRACTICES

Figure 3 illustrates the basic elements of a properly grounded electrical system. The important elements of the electrical system grounding are described below.

Figure 3 – Basic Elements of Proper Grounding of an Electrical System

Ground Rod
The grounding rod is the basic component of most grounding schemes to provide the electrical connection from the power system ground to earth. The item of primary interest in evaluating the adequacy of the ground rod is the resistance of this connection. There are three basic components of resistance in a grounding rod:

  • Electrode Resistance. Resistance due to the physical connection of the grounding wire to the grounding rod.
  • Rod-Earth Contact Resistance. Resistance due to the interface between the soil and the rod. This resistance is inversely proportional to the surface area of the grounding rod (i.e. more area of contact means lower resistance).
  • Ground Resistance. Due to the resistivity of the soil near the grounding rod, the soil resistivity varies over a wide range, depending on the soil type and moisture content.

The resistance of the ground rod connection is important because it influences transient voltage levels during switching events and lightning transients. High magnitude currents during lightning strokes result in a voltage across the resistance, raising the ground reference for the entire facility. The difference in voltage between the ground reference and true earth ground will appear at grounded equipment within the facility and this can result in dangerous touch potentials.

Service Entrance Connections
The service entrance is where the primary components of a properly grounded system are found. The neutral point of the supply power system is connected to the grounded conductor (neutral wire) at this point. This is also the one location in the system (except in the case of a separately derived system) where the grounded conductor is connected to the ground conductor (green wire) via the bonding jumper. The ground conductor is also connected to the building grounding electrode via the grounding electrode conductor at the service entrance. For most effective grounding, the grounding electrode conductor should be exothermically welded at both ends.

The grounding electrode conductor is sized based on guidelines in the National Electric Code (Section 250-94). Table 250-94 from the Code provides the basic guidelines.

There are a number of options for the building grounding electrode. It is important that all of the different grounding electrodes used in a building are connected together at the service entrance. The following are permissible for grounding electrodes:

  • Underground Water Pipe (see Table 250-94 for grounding electrode conductor requirements for connection to the neutral bus)
  • Building Steel (see Table 250-94 for grounding electrode conductor requirements for connection to the neutral bus or the underground water pipe)
  • Ground Ring. A ground ring can be used in addition to building steel to provide a better equipotential ground for the grounding electrode. It is connected to the main grounding electrode with a conductor that is not larger than the ground ring conductor.
  • Concrete Encased Electrode. This can serve a similar purpose to a ground ring and is connected to the main grounding electrode with a conductor that has a minimum size #4 AWG.
  • Ground Rod. The ground rod is connected to the main building grounding electrode with a conductor that has a minimum size #6 AWG.

Throughout the system, a safety ground must be maintained to ensure that all exposed conductors that may be touched are kept at an equal potential. This safety ground also provides a ground fault return path to the point where the power source neutral conductor is grounded. The safety ground can consist of the conduit itself or the conduit and a separate conductor (ground conductor or green wire) in the conduit. This safety ground originates at the service entrance and is carried throughout the building.

Panel Board
The panel board is the point in the system where the various branch circuits are supplied by a feeder from the service entrance. The panel board provides breakers in series with the phase conductors, connects the grounded conductor (neutral) of the branch circuit to that of the feeder circuit, and connects the ground conductor (green wire) to the feeder ground conductor, conduit, and enclosure. It is important to note that there should not be a neutral to ground connection at the panel board. This neutral-to-ground connection is prohibited in the National Electric Code, as it would result in load return currents flowing the ground path between the panel board and the service entrance. In order to maintain an equipotential grounding system, the ground path should not contain any load return current. In addition, fault currents would split between the neutral conductor and the ground return path. Protection is based on the fault current flowing in the ground path.

Isolated Ground
The noise performance of the supply to sensitive loads can sometimes be improved by providing an isolated ground to the load. This is done using isolated ground receptacles, which are orange in color. If an isolated ground receptacle is being used downline from the panel board, the isolated ground conductor is not connected to the conduit or enclosure in the panel board, but only to the ground conductor of the supply feeder (see Figure 4). The conduit is the safety ground in this case and is connected to the enclosure. A separate conductor can also be used for the safety ground in addition to the conduit. This technique is described in the NEC, Article 274, Exception 4 on receptacles. It is not described as a grounding technique.

The isolated ground receptacle is orange in color for identification purposes. This receptacle does not have the ground conductor connected to the receptacle enclosure or conduit. The isolated ground conductor may pass back through several panel boards without being connected to local ground until grounded at the service entrance or other separately derived ground. The use of isolated ground receptacles requires careful wiring practices to avoid unintentional connections between the isolated ground and the safety ground. In general, dedicated branch circuits accomplish the same objective as isolated ground receptacles without the concern for complicated wiring.

Figure 4 – Grounding Configuration for an Isolated Ground

Separately Derived Systems
A separately derived system has a ground reference that is independent from other systems. A common example of this is a delta-wye grounded transformer (see Figure 5). The wye connected secondary neutral is connected to local building ground (not a separate ground rod) to provide a new ground reference independent from the rest of the system. The point in the system where this new ground reference is defined is like a service entrance in that the system neutral is connected to the grounded conductor (neutral wire) that is connected to the ground conductor with a bonding jumper.

Separately derived systems are used to provide a local ground reference for sensitive loads. The local ground reference can have significantly reduced noise levels as compared to the system ground if an isolation transformer is used to supply the separately derived system. An additional benefit is that neutral currents are localized to the load side of the separately derived system. This can help reduce neutral current magnitudes in the overall system when there are large numbers of single-phase nonlinear loads.

Figure 5 – Configuration for a Separately Derived System

Grounding Techniques for Signal Reference
Most of the grounding requirements previously described deal with the concerns for safety and proper operation of protective devices. Grounding is also used to provide a signal reference point for equipment exchanging signals over communication or control circuits within a facility. The requirements for a signal reference ground are often significantly different from the requirements for a safety ground. However, the safety ground requirements must always be considered first whenever designing a grounding scheme.

The most important characteristic of a signal reference ground is that it must have low impedance. One way to accomplish this (at least for low frequencies) is to use an adequately sized ground conductor. Conduit is particularly bad for a signal reference ground because it relies on continuity of connections and the impedance is high relative to the phase and neutral conductors. Undersized ground conductors have the same problem of high impedance.

For reducing power quality problems, the ground conductor should be at least the same size as the phase conductors and the neutral conductor (the neutral conductor may need to be larger than the phase conductors in some special cases involving nonlinear single phase loads).

The signal reference ground must look like a ground over a wide range of frequencies. The safety ground requirements are based only on 60 Hz. As frequency increases, the wavelength becomes short enough to cause resonances for relatively short lengths of wire. A good rule of thumb is that when the length of the ground conductor is greater than 1/20th of the signal wavelength, the ground conductor is no longer effective at that frequency. Since the grounding system is more complicated than a simple conductor, there is actually a complicated impedance vs. frequency characteristic involved.

One way to provide a signal reference ground to sensitive equipment that is effective over a wide range of frequencies (0-30 MHz) is to use a signal reference grid or zero reference grid. This technique uses a rectangular mesh of copper wire with about two-foot spacing. Even if a portion of the conductor system is in resonance at a particular frequency, there will always be other paths of the grid that are not in resonance due to the multiple paths available for current to flow. When using a signal reference grid, the enclosure of each piece of equipment must still be connected to a single common ground via the ground conductor (NEC requirement). The enclosures may also be connected to the closest interconnection of the grid to provide a high frequency, low impedance signal reference.

Additional Practices for Sensitive Equipment
The following practices are appropriate for any installation with equipment that may be sensitive to noise or disturbances introduced due to coupling in the ground system:

  • Whenever possible, use individual branch circuits to power sensitive equipment. Individual branch circuits provide good isolation for high frequency transients and noise.
  • Conduit should never be the sole source of grounding for sensitive equipment (even though it may be legal). Currents flowing on the conduit can cause interference with communications and electronics.
  • Green wire grounds should be the same size as the current carrying conductors and the individual circuit conduit should be bonded at both ends.
  • Use building steel as a ground reference, whenever available. The building steel usually provides an excellent, low impedance ground reference for a building. Additional ground electrodes (water pipes, etc.) can be used as supplemental to the building steel.
  • These practices are often applied in computer rooms, where the frequency response of the grounding system is even more important due to communication requirements between different parts of a computer system.
  • Either install a signal reference grid under a raised floor or use the raised floor as a signal reference grid. This is not a replacement for the safety ground, but augments the safety ground for noise reduction.
  • Addition of a transient suppression plate at or near the power entry point (with the power cabling laid on top of it) to provide a controlled capacitive and magnetic coupling noise bypass between building reinforced steel and the electrical ground conductors.
TYPICAL WIRING AND GROUNDING PROBLEMS

The previous sections described proper procedures for grounding of electrical systems. The following sections outline some typical problems that can be experienced with the wiring and grounding of electrical systems. It is useful to be aware of these typical problems when performing site surveys. Many of the problems can be detected through simple observations. Other problems require measurements of voltages, currents, or impedances in the circuits.

Problems with Conductors and Connectors
The first things to look for when inspecting the service entrance, panel boards, and equipment wiring during a site survey are problems with conductors or connections. A bad connection (faulty, loose, or resistive connection) will result in heating, possible arcing, and burning of insulation. Table 1 summarizes some of the wiring problems that can be uncovered during a site survey.

Table 1 – Problems with Conductors and Connectors

Noted ProblemPossible Cause
Burnt smell at the panel, junction box, or load equipmentFaulted conductor, bad connection, arcing, or overloaded wiring
Panel or junction box is warm to the touchFaulty circuit breaker or bad connection
Buzzing (corona effect)Arcing
Scorched insulationOverloaded wiring, faulted conductor, or bad connection
No voltage at load equipmentTripped breaker, bad connection, or faulted conductor
Intermittent voltage at the load equipmentBad connection or arcing
Scorched panel or junction boxBad connection, faulted conductor

Missing Safety Ground
If the safety ground is missing, a fault in the equipment from the phase conductor to the enclosure results in line potential on the exposed surfaces of the equipment. No breakers will trip and a hazardous situation results.

Multiple Neutral to Ground Connections
Unless there is a separately derived system, the only neutral to ground bond should be at the service entrance. The neutral and ground should be kept separate at all panel boards and junction boxes. Down neutral-to-ground bonds result in parallel paths for the load return current where one of the paths becomes the ground circuit. This can cause misoperation of protective devices. In addition, during a fault condition, the fault current will split between the ground and the neutral that could prevent proper operation of protective devices (a serious safety concern). This is a direct violation of the NEC.

Ungrounded Equipment
Isolated grounds are sometimes used due to the perceived notion of obtaining a “clean” ground. Procedures which involve an illegal insulating bushing in the power source conduit and replacing the prescribed equipment grounding conductor with one to an “Isolated Dedicated Computer Ground” are dangerous, violate code, and are unlikely to solve noise problems.

Additional Ground Rods
Ground rods for a facility should be part of a grounding system, connected where all the building grounding electrodes (building steel, metal water pipe, etc.) are bonded together. Multiple ground rods can be bused together at the service entrance to reduce the overall ground resistance. Isolated grounds can be used for sensitive equipment, as described previously. However, these should not include isolated ground rods to establish a new ground reference for the equipment. The most important problem with additional ground rods is that they create additional paths for lightning stroke currents to flow. With the ground rod at the service entrance, any lightning stroke current reaching the facility goes to ground at the service entrance and the ground potential of the whole facility rises together. With additional ground rods, a portion of the lightning stroke current will flow on the building wiring (green ground conductor and/or conduit) to reach the additional ground rods. This creates a possible transient voltage problem for equipment and a possible overload problem for the conductors.

Ground Loops
Ground loops are one of the most important grounding problems in many commercial and industrial environments that include data processing and communication equipment. If two devices are grounded via different paths and a communication cable between the devices provides another ground connection between them, a ground loop results. Slightly different potentials in the two power system grounds can cause circulating currents in this ground loop. Because the communication signal levels can be quite low (e.g., five volts), very low magnitudes of circulating current can cause serious noise problems. The best solution to this problem is to use optical couplers in the communication lines, thereby eliminating the ground loop.

Insufficient Neutral Conductor
An example current waveform for a switched-mode power supply was provided in the harmonics section. This type of load, as well as fluorescent lighting with electronic ballasts is becoming increasingly prevalent in commercial environments. The high harmonic contents present in these load currents can have a very important impact on the required neutral conductor rating for the supply circuits.

The most important harmonic component in these load currents is the third. Third harmonic currents in a balanced system appear in the zero sequence circuit. This means that third harmonic currents from three single phase loads will add in the neutral, rather than cancel as is the case for the 60 Hz current. For the current waveform shown in Figure 6, this means that the neutral current could be as high as 240% (80% third harmonic current on each phase) of the fundamental frequency phase current magnitude. In typical commercial buildings with a diversity of switch mode power supply loads, the neutral current is typically in the range 140%-170% of the fundamental frequency phase current magnitude. CBEMA has recognized this concern and has prepared a brief to alert the industry to problems caused by harmonics from computer power supplies.

Figure 6 – High Neutral Current from Single-Phase Nonlinear Loads

The possible solutions to neutral conductor overloading include the following:

  • Run a separate neutral conductor for each phase in a three-phase circuit that serves single-phase nonlinear loads.
  • When a shared neutral must be used in a three-phase circuit with single-phase nonlinear loads, the neutral conductor capacity should be approximately double the phase conductor capacity.
  • Delta-wye transformers designed for nonlinear loads can be used to limit the penetration of high neutral currents. These transformers should be placed as close as possible to the nonlinear loads (e.g., in the computer room). The neutral conductors on the secondary of each separately derived system must be rated based on the expected neutral current magnitudes.
  • Filters to control the third harmonic current that can be placed at the individual loads are becoming available. These will be an alternative in existing installations where changing the wiring may be an expensive proposition.
SOLUTIONS TO WIRING AND GROUNDING PROBLEMS

The grounding system should be designed to accomplish these minimum objectives:

  • There should never be load currents flowing in the grounding system under normal operating conditions. There is likely to be low currents in the grounding system due to the connection of protective devices and other connections between line and ground (in fact, if the ground current is actually zero, there is probably an open ground connection). However, these currents should be much smaller than the load currents.
  • There should be, as near as possible, an equipotential reference for all devices and locations in the system.
  • To avoid excessive touch potential safety risks, all equipment and enclosures should be connected to the equipotential grounding system.

The most important implications resulting from these objectives are:

  • There can only be one neutral-to-ground bond for any subsystem. A separately derived system may be created with a transformer, allowing establishment of a new neutral-to-ground bond.
  • There must be sufficient interconnections in the equipotential plane to achieve low impedance over a wide frequency range.
  • All equipment and enclosures should be grounded.

Finally, consideration should be given to how various loads are grouped in the distribution panel as shown in Figure 7. Electronic tills, computers, lab equipment, and other loads should be powered from a dedicated circuit with separate conductors.

Figure 7 – Samples of a Load Grouping
SUMMARY

Wiring and grounding problems are responsible for many power quality variations within customer facilities. Some electric utility engineers have estimated that 80% of all the power quality problems reported by customers are found to be due to their own wiring and grounding problems. While end-users may have a different opinion, it is commonplace for many power quality problems to be resolved by simply tightening a loose connection, removing an unnecessary ground connection, bonding ground conductors, or replacing a corroded conductor. Therefore, the first step in any power quality investigation is to evaluate the wiring and grounding practices of the facility.

This case provided general information on proper grounding practices and outlines common problems that are encountered.

REFERENCES

IEEE Standard 100. Terms and Definitions
IEEE Standard 1100. IEEE Recommended Practice for Powering and Grounding Sensitive Equipment (The Emerald Book).
Grounding and Shielding in Facilities, R. Morrison and W. H. Lewis, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1990.


RELATED STANDARDS
IEEE Std. 1100-1999
IEEE Std. 142-1991
National Electric Code (NEC)

GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS
ADP: Automated Data Processing
CBEMA: Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association
NEC: National Electric Code

Power Quality and Electrical Arc Furnaces

Published by Horia Andrei1, Costin Cepisca2 and Sorin Grigorescu2
1Valahia University of Targoviste, 2Politehnica University of Bucharest, Romania


1.Introduction

The chapter covers general issues related to power quality in Electric Arc Furnaces. The use of electric arc furnaces (EAF) for steelmaking has grown dramatically in the last decade. Of the steel made today 36% is produced by the electric arc furnace route and this share will increase to 50 by 2030.

The electric arc furnaces are used for melting and refining metals, mainly iron in the steel production. AC and DC arc furnaces represent one of the most intensive disturbing loads in the sub-transmission or transmission electric power systems; they are characterized by rapid changes in absorbed powers that occur especially in the initial stage of melting, during which the critical condition of a broken arc may become a short circuit or an open circuit. In the particular case of the DC arc furnaces, the presence of the AC/DC static converters and the random motion of the electric arc, whose nonlinear and time-varying nature is well known, are responsible for dangerous perturbations such as waveform distortions and voltage fluctuations.

Nowadays, arc furnaces are designed for very large power input ratings and due to the nature of both, the electrical arc and the melt down process, these devices can cause large power quality problems on the electrical net, mainly harmonics, inter-harmonics, flicker and voltage imbalances.

The Voltage-Current characteristic of the arc is non-linear, what can cause harmonic currents. These currents, when circulating by the electric net can produce harmonic voltages, which can affect to other users.

In evaluation and limitation, there are some definitions and standards to quantify the disturbance levels, such as (IEC, 1999), (IEEE 1995), and (***IEEE, 1996). and. The total harmonic distortion (THD), short-term voltage flicker severity (Pst), and long-term voltage flicker severity (Plt) are used. However, sometimes it is desired to record voltage and current waveforms in the specified duration to track the disturbance levels.

2.Electrical arc furnaces

2.1 Construction and typical steelmaking cycle
An electric arc furnace (EAF) transfers electrical energy to thermal energy in the form of an electric arc to melt the raw materials held by the furnace. The arc is established between an electrode and the melting bath and is characterized by a low voltage and a high current. Arc furnaces differ from induction furnaces in that the charge material is directly exposed to an electric arc, and the current in the furnace terminals passes through the charged material. Sir Humphrey Davy conducted an experimental demonstration in 1810 and welding was investigated by Pepys in 1815. Pinchon attempted to create an electrothermic furnace in 1853 and, in 1878 – 79, William Siemens took out patents for an electric arc furnaces. The first electric arc furnaces were developed by Paul Héroult, with a commercial plant established in the United States in 1907. While EAFs were widely used in World War II for production of alloy steels, it was only later that electric steelmaking began to expand. Of the steel made today 36% is produced by the electric arc furnace route and this share will increase to 50 by 2030.

A schematic cross-section through an EAF is presented in figure 1: three electrodes (black), molten bath (red), tapping spout at left, refractory brick movable roof, brick shell, and a refractory-lined bowl-shaped hearth.

Fig. 1. Cross-section trough an EAF

The furnace is primarily split into three sections:

  • the shell, which consists of the sidewalls and lower steel ‘bowl’;
  • the hearth, which consists of the refractory that lines the lower bowl;
  • the roof, which may be refractory-lined or water-cooled, and supports the refractory delta in its centre, through which one or more graphite electrodes enter.

Separate from the furnace structure is the electrode support and electrical system, and the tilting platform on which the furnace rests. Possible configurations: the electrode supports and the roof tilt with the furnace, or are fixed to the raised platform.

A typical alternating current furnace has three electrodes (Hernandez et al., 2007). The arc forms between the charged material and the electrode, the charge is heated both by current passing through the charge and by the radiant energy evolved by the arc. The electrodes are automatically raised and lowered by a positioning system and a regulating system maintains approximately constant current and power input during the melting of the charge, even though scrap may move under the electrodes as it melts. Since the electrodes move up and down automatically, heavy water-cooled cables connect the bus tubes/arms with the transformer located adjacent to the furnace.

The energy diagram shown in Figure 2 indicates that 70% of the total energy is electrical, the remainder being chemical energy arising from the oxidation elements such as carbon, iron, and silicon and the burning of natural gas with oxy-fuel burners. About 53 % of the total energy leaves the furnace in the liquid steel, while the remainder is lost to slag, waste gas, or cooling.

Fig. 2. Energy patterns in an EAF

A mid-sized modern steelmaking furnace would have a transformer rated about 60 MVA, with a secondary voltage between 400 and 900 volts and a secondary current in excess of 44,000 amperes. To produce a ton of steel in an EAF requires approximately 440 kWh per metric tone; the theoretical minimum amount of energy required to melt a tone of scrap steel is 300 kWh (melting point 1520°C).

Fig. 3. Basic innovations and improvement in the 120-t EAF performances

Electric Arc Furnaces (EAF) are being greatly improved at a fast pace. Only 20–30 years ago today’s EAF performance would be impossible to imagine (Hurst, 1994). Owing to the impressive number of innovations the tap-to-tap time has been shortened to 30–40 min. for the best 100–130 ton furnaces operating with scrap. Accordingly, their hourly and annual productivity increased. Electrical energy consumption got reduced approximately in half, from 580–650 to 320–350 kWh/ton. Electrical energy share in overall energy consumption per heat dropped to 50%. Electrode consumption was reduced 4–5 times – Figure 3. Typical steelmaking cycles are:

  • arc ignition period (start of power supply) – figure 4a
  • boring period –figure 4b
  • molten metal formation period – figure 4c
  • main melting period – figure 4d
  • meltdown period –figure 4e
  • meltdown heating period – figure 4f
Fig. 4. Typical steelmaking cycle

Electrodes are initially lowered to a point above the material, the current is initiated, and the electrodes bore through the scrap to form a pool of liquid metal. The scrap itself protects the furnace lining from the high intensity arc. Subsequently, the arc is lengthened by increasing the voltage to maximum power. In the final stage, when there is a nearly complete metal pool, the arc is shortened to reduce radiation heat losses and to avoid refractory damage and hot spots.

After melt dawn, oxygen usually is injected to oxidize the carbon in the steel or the charged carbon. This process is an important source of energy; the carbon monoxide that evolves helps minimize the absorption of nitrogen and flushes hydrogen out of the metal. It also foams the slag, which helps minimize heat loss.

The random movement of the melting material has as consequence that no two cycles of the arc voltage and current waveforms are identical. The impact of these large, highly varying loads has a direct impact on the power quality of the interconnected power system. The abrupt initiation and interruption of current flow provides a source of harmonic currents and causes considerable disturbance to high-impedance circuits. Voltage and current waves deviate considerably from symmetrical sinusoidal patterns. Disturbances are worst during early meltdown, and they occur at varying frequencies.

Generation of harmonics may result in further flicker problems, and equipment on the power system may also be damaged. If static capacitors are to be used to improve the power factor, an analysis to ensure that resonance does not exist at any of the harmonic frequencies should be made. Harmonics contribute to wave distortion and to the increase in effective inductive reactance. This increase is often in the 10 to 15% range and has been reported as high as 25%. Current into the furnace is therefore less than what would be expected from calculations based on sinusoidal wave shapes, and losses in frequency sensitive equipment such as transformers are higher than the sinusoidal wave shape would produce. Generally, the initial period of melting causes the most electrical disturbances. As the scrap temperature begins to rise, a liquid pool forms, and disturbances begin to diminish. This is generally about 10 minutes or so after power-on and can vary depending on power levels and practices.

After about 20 minutes, most electric furnaces will have begun converting scrap to liquid metal. Hence, wide swings in disturbances will diminish considerably. When sufficient molten metal exists the arc is shortened by an adjustment to the electrode regulators. The current will rise since overall resistance is reduced, and the power factor and arc power will decline.

2.2 Perturbations
The majority of electric and electronic circuits (arc welders and furnaces, variable speed controllers, PC’s, medical equipment, etc) use switch mode techniques which act as a non linear load or disturbance generator which degrades the quality of the electricity supply.

In these electro energetic steady state circuits, the importance of the inconvenience caused by the non sinusoidal system of running is directly correlated to the amplitude of the harmonics. Also, it is of utmost importance to determine the variation of the apparent power at non defined node, in accordance with the presence of the current and voltage harmonics. Understanding the current harmonics and voltage harmonics is of utmost scientific importance both to the beneficiaries, who thus can prevent the undesirable effects of non sinusoidal steady state in a given network, and to the possible consumers as for as the corresponding measurement and pricing are concerned. Hence the elaboration of certain rules and prescription as regards the influence of the harmonics upon the fundamental component (first harmonic).

Such combinations of traditional and non-traditional loads, coupled with fluctuating loads, causes problems often classified as “random” or “sporadic” (problems with sensitive devices), annoying (light flickering) or as “strange” or “without apparent reason” (problems with cabling, capacitor banks, tripping, signaling etc.). The electric arc furnace produces strong disturbing effects featured by non-symmetries of currents and voltages, harmonics, flickers, voltage drops and over-voltages, characteristic parameters of power quality.

Many ways exist to reduce the effects of the arc disturbances. These are determined by the utility system to which the furnace or furnaces are to be connected, and they are influenced mainly by the size and stability of the power grid. Some sizable shops require no particular flicker control equipment. It is quite possible that, if a furnace shop is fed from a 220 kV or higher system with a short-circuit capacity of 6500 MVA or more, the utility will experience very little load disturbance, and the steelmaker can have considerable flexibility in configuring his internal plant power system.

Most utilities require power factor correction. Shops with large electric furnaces would more than likely use static capacitors; synchronous condensers of sufficient capacity would be prohibitively expensive for a multi-furnace shop. Before such systems are installed, transient analysis is required to determine:

  • Capacitor bank configuration
  • Need for harmonic tuning of sections
  • Switching procedure

If additional regulation is needed, VAR control equipment would probably be required. However, if plans have already been made for power factor capacitors, including tuning reactors, then the thyristors and main reactor are the only further additions required. The perturbations caused by electric arc furnaces are of random nature and encompass a frequency range from DC to a few hundreds of Hz. Depending on whether AC of DC is used to supply the electric arc furnace there are unbalances, harmonics, inter-harmonics or voltage flicker.

2.3 Arc furnace models
For the design of EAF is necessary to utilize a suitable model. In this regard, numerous models have been presented to describe the electric arc (Lazaroiu & Zaninelli, 2010); (Math et al., 2006); (Hooshmand & Esfahani, 2009); (Sankaran, 2008). In general the models can be classified into:
a. Time domain analysis methods:

  • Nonlinear Resistance Model: The approximation on the V-I characteristic of the arc,
    performed by piecewise linearization, neglect of the voltage rising time or nonlinear
    approximation. This method uses the numerical analysis method to solve the
    differential equation which is used to describe the furnace system with the assumed V-I
    characteristic.
    However it is a primitive model and does not consider the time-varying characteristic
    of arc furnaces;
  • Current source models: An EAF is typically modelled as a current source represented by
    the Fourier series where the coefficients may change randomly during every period.
    This model is perfectly suited to size filter components and to evaluate voltage
    distortions resulting from the harmonic current injected into the system.
  • Voltage Source Models: The voltage source model for an EAF is a Thévenin equivalent
    circuit where equivalent impedance of the furnace load impedance including the electrodes. The voltage source can be modelled in different ways. One possibility is to form it by major harmonic components that are known empirically. This method loses the stochastic characteristics of arc furnaces like the nonlinear resistance model does.
  • Nonlinear Time Varying Voltage Source Model: The arc voltage is defined as a nonlinear
    function of the arc length. The time variation of the arc length is modeled with
    deterministic or stochastic laws.
  • Nonlinear Time Varying Resistance Models: Arc furnace operation can be described by
    three basic states: open circuit, short circuit and normal operation. During normal
    operation the arc resistance can be modelled following an approximate Gaussian
    distribution. The random fluctuation in arc resistance accounts for the short-term
    perceptibility flicker index Pst.

b. Frequency domain analysis methods represent the arc voltage and current by their harmonic components (Key & Lai, 1997). The Harmonic Voltage Source Model first applies the Fourier transform to the arc voltage to obtain its harmonic components. Then the current harmonic components are calculated through the arc voltage harmonic components. Calculations provide an equivalent circuit for the fundamental frequency component consisting of an equivalent arc resistance and a reactance. The equivalent circuit for the calculation of the different order harmonics consists of a harmonic voltage source and the system impedance for that harmonic frequency. The model is simple, but suitable for steady-state iterative harmonic analysis.

c. Power balance method.
This model provides a harmonic domain solution method of nonlinear differential equation. The arc furnace load model is developed from the energy balance equation, which is actually a nonlinear differential equation of arc radius and arc current. This model uses some experimental parameters to reflect the arc furnace operation, but it neglects the influence of its supply system.

3.Basic principles for the power quality analysis

3.1 Power quality and harmonic distortion
One of the most important problems in nowadays consumers power supply is to ensure the power quality. Together with the power suppliers, the consumers are interested to use, to produce and to transport the electrical power as clean as possible. Any perturbation produced in the power system by any of its elements (components) may seriously affect the power quality consumed by the other elements especially those closely situated to the perturbing component (Filipski, et al., 1994).

The Power Quality has concerned the experts from power engineering area as far back as first years of using the energy, in a large amount of applications, the alternating current; during the last decade, we can observe several ascertainments to the involvement for this domain, owing to development based on power electronics.

Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard IEEE 1100 define power quality as “a concept of powering and grounding sensitive electronic equipment in a manner suitable for the equipment”. But this is not the only interpretation. Another simple and more concise definition might state: “Power quality is a set of electrical boundaries that allows equipment to function in its intended manner without significant loss of performance or life expectancy”, definition that embraces two things that we demand from electrical equipment: performance and life expectancy. Another definition of power quality, based on the principle of EMC, is as follows: power quality refers to a wide variety of electromagnetic phenomena that characterize voltage and current at a given time and at a given location on the power system. IEC 61000-4-30 defines power quality as ”the characteristics of the electricity at a given point on an electrical system, evaluated against a set of reference technical parameters” (Toulouevski & Zinurov, 2010); (***IEEE, 1995). Power quality can be interpreted by the existence of two components:

  • Voltage quality. It expresses the voltage deviation from the ideal one and can be
    interpreted as the product quality delivered by the utilities.
  • Current quality. It expresses the current deviation from the ideal one and can be
    interpreted as the product quality received by the customers.

The main Power quality disturbances are:

  • harmonics;
  • under-voltages or over-voltages;
  • flicker;
  • transients;
  • transients and voltage sags;
  • voltage sags;
  • interruptions.

Among the greatest electrical perturbations in a power system is the electrical arc furnace. Its perturbations are visible upon the reactive power flow, the load unbalance and the harmonics injected in the supply network. Also the random variation of the EAF electrical load, leads to the “flicker” phenomena characterized by variation in the field of 0.3-0.5% of the rated voltage and frequencies variations of 6 up to 10 Hz. Physically, the flicker phenomena is visible for the electrical bulbs that are rapidly changing the light intensity. Also, the side effects of the flicker are visible for the modern computation technique that could be damaged by the voltage variations.

At this moment we cannot talk about a united standardization of electrical energy quality on an international level and sometimes on national one. Currently, several engineering organizations and standard bearers in several parts of the world (IEEE, IEC, ANSI,…) are spending a large amount of resources to generate power quality standards. Some of them classify the events as steady-state and non-steady-state phenomena, in some regulations the most important factor is the duration of the event, other guidelines use the wave shape (duration and magnitude) of each event to classify problems and other standards (e.g., IEC) use the frequency range of the event for the classification. These documents come in three levels of applicability and validity: guidelines, recommendations and standards. In almost all the countries, the directives system of electrical energy quality is composed by several quantitative characteristics of slow or rapid variations of effective voltage value, the shape or symmetry as well as characteristics of slow or rapid frequency variations (IEEE-WG, 1996); (PE, 2004) (SREN, 1998); (CMP, 1987).

As it can be seen in Figure 5 there are presented the main causes of an improper electrical energy quality.

For the measurements of disturbances, IEC 61000-4-7 describes testing and measurement techniques for harmonics and inter-harmonics measurements and instrumentation, for power supply systems and equipment connected thereto.

Fig. 5. Causes of an improper electrical energy quality

3.2 The prominent power quality aspects
The prominent power quality aspects considered are the following:
a. Voltages and currents are non sinusoidal quantities, and can be expressed by relations:

where Uk , Ik are the RMS of each k-harmonic of voltage, respectively current, ω is the angular frequency, γk is the phase angle or each k-harmonic of voltage, k-harmonic of voltage, ϕk is difference of each phase angle of k-harmonic of voltage and current, t is the time.

– the active power
– the reactive power
– the apparent power
– the power factor
– the reactive factor
– the deforming factor

where D = √S2 − P2 −Q2 is the Budeanu distortion (deforming) power.

b. The presence of voltage and current harmonics is evaluated through a relative quantity, the total harmonic distortion (THD). Voltage harmonics are asserted with THDU, the ratio of the RMS value of the harmonic voltage to the RMS value of the fundamental, calculated by relation:

Everything presented for voltage harmonics is also valid for current harmonics and THDI, the ratio of the RMS value of the harmonic current to the RMS value of the fundamental, calculated by relation:

Total harmonic distortion is the ratio between deforming residue and effective value of fundamental waveform:

Harmonic level is the ratio between effective value of the considered harmonic and the effective value of the fundamental:

c. Voltage imbalance. Applying the theory of symmetrical components, an unbalanced three-phase sinusoidal voltage system [Va, Vb, Vc] can be decomposed into a positive-sequence three-phase balanced system V+, a negative-sequence system V-, and a zero sequence system V0

d. Disturbance transiting among voltage levels: Rapid voltage changes, Transient overvoltages and voltage fluctuation and flicker.

3.3 Power quality measurements
A simple way for a technician to determine power quality in their system without sophisticated equipment is to compare voltage readings between two accurate voltmeters measuring the same system voltage: one meter being an “averaging” type of unit (such as an electromechanical movement meter) and the other being a “true-RMS (rms)” type of unit (such as a high-quality digital meter). Remember that “averaging” type meters are calibrated so that their scales indicate volts RMS, based on the assumption that the AC voltage being measured is sinusoidal. If the voltage is anything but sine wave-shaped, the averaging meter will not register the proper value, whereas the true-RMS meter always will, regardless of wave-shape.

The rule of thumb here is this: the greater the disparity between the two meters, the worse the power quality is, and the greater its harmonic content. A power system with good quality power should generate equal voltage readings between the two meters, to within the rated error tolerance of the two instruments.

Measurement and testing of supply voltage quality, according to EN 50160, requires specialized apparatus and measuring methods. This arrangement enables continuous monitoring, short time and long time, over 7 days, of the following parameters:

  • frequency;
  • total harmonic distortion factor THDU and THDI;
  • voltage unbalance factor, which is a multiple of positive and negative sequence voltage
    components;
  • fast and slow voltage variations, which are defined as short term (Pst) and long term
    (Plt) flicker;
  • severity factors.

This type of equipment, named digital power analyzer also enables measurement of voltage dips and outages, its frequency and duration.

The RMS values of voltages and currents can be determined correctly by digital methods in any harmonic content of waveforms. Also, with the results of RMS voltage and current can calculate the apparent power. The active power may be calculated and accurately measured in any circumstances of harmonic pollution. Unfortunately this is not the case for reactive power. For reactive power can be used different definitions and methods (Arrillage et. al., 2001); (Czarnecki, 1987); (Emmanuel, 1995); (Emmanuel, 1999); (Katic, 1994):

  • reactive power measurement (Budeanu definition);
  • Hilbert transform method;
  • power triangle method;
  • quarter period time delay method;
  • low-pass filter method.

Table 1 presents the test conditions, voltage and current, used to test the measurement performances of the reactive power measurement solutions. Table 2 presents the errors obtained for different tests using notations: H- for Hilbert transform, LPF- for low pass filter, PT-power triangle, CTD- compensated time delay.

The traditional measurement methods, like Power triangle and the Time delay, comply with international standards but show limitations in the presence of harmonics or line frequency variation.

One can observe that Hilbert method give the best results, followed by the low pass filter method and then power triangle method. So, different analyzers implemented with different formulas can give discrepancies measuring the same loads.

Table 1.

Test conditions, voltage and current, used to test the measurement performances of the reactive power measurement solutions

Table 2.

Errors obtained for different tests using notations: H- for Hilbert transform, LPF- for low pass filter, PT-power triangle, CTD- compensated time delay
4.Numerical simulations for energy calculation in power measurements

The model presented in (Vervenne et. al., 2007) is based on exponential-hyperbolic form which causes many problems in the power system quality. Also the model can describe different operations of the EAF and it does not need specific initial conditions.

Fig. 6. EAF connected to supply system

The electric diagram of a electrical circuit supplying an EAF is illustrated in Figure 6. In this figure, bus 1 is the point of common coupling (PCC) which is the supplying bus of the EAF transformer. The arc furnace is also connected to the PCC through the transformer TS, (HV/MV). In this figure, XC and RC are the reactance and resistance of the connecting cable line to the furnace electrodes, respectively. Also, XLsc is the short circuit reactance at bus PCC.

The electric arc is modeled by the following equations:

where V and i are arc voltage and current of the EAF, respectively. Also Vat is the voltage
threshold magnitude to which voltage approaches as current increases. Furthermore, I0 is
the current time constant in kA. It should be noted that the voltage Vat depends on the arc
length.

The constants C and D are corresponding to the arc power and arc current, respectively. These constants can take different values which depend on the sign of the derivative of the arc current.

As it can be seen in electric arc modeled equation, for the positive current and regarding the hysterias property of the arc, there are two cases. In the increasing current case, the hyperbolic equation and in the decreasing current case exponential equation is used. Hence, this model is called exponential-hyperbolic model. The proposed method has the capability of describing the EAF behavior in time domain using differential equation. In addition, it is able to analyze the behaviors in the frequency domain without solving the sophisticated differential equations.

Moreover, the proposed model can describe different operating conditions of the EAF such as initial melting (scrap stage), mild melting (platting stage) and refinement of the EAF. With the parameters of the system:

XLsc = 9.4245Ω, Xc = 2.356 mΩ, Rc = 0.4 mΩ, fsys = 50 Hz

and:

Vat = 200 V, Ca = 190 kW, Cb = 39 kW, Da = Db = 5 kA, Io = 10 kA

the voltage-current characteristic of the arc is obtained and shown in Figure 7. The voltage and the current of the arc are illustrated in Figure 8.

The characterization of flicker produced by an arc furnace is an extremely difficult operation (Alonso & Donsion, 2004); (Beites et. al., 2001); (Webster, 2004). The flicker is variable from one cycle to another and during melting stage very high peaks are produced. It depends on following parameters: quality and quantity of used scrap, reference operating points, quantity of injected oxygen, unpredictable consequences due to crumbling of the scrap during melting.

Consequently it is recommended to evaluate the level of flicker produced during at least one week of operation, representing several tens of operation cycles. LabVIEW and MATLAB software are used for simulation on EAF (Andrei et. al., 2006); (Andrei et. al., 2006); (Andrei et. al., 2006); (Beites et. al., 2001); (Bracale et. al., 2005); (Buzac & Cepisca, 2008).

Fig. 7. Voltage-current characteristic for the exponential-hyperbolic model
Fig. 8. Waveforms in the exponential-hyperbolic mode
5.Results of measurements in a real electric installation of arc furnace

5.1 Measurement method and equipment
The three-phase power analyzer is used for the analysis of power quality with compatible software analysis. The following quantities are necessary to be measured: voltage, current, flicker (IEC 68, IEC 61000-4-15-PST and PLT), THD, waveform snapshots and harmonics up to the minimum order of 64, frequency, transient events (Chi-Jui Wu & Tsu-Hsun Fu, 2003); (Pretorius et al., 1998).

The strategy of measurements was to carry out recordings on EAF with all electrical quantities: RMS voltage, RMS current, flicker, frequency, THD voltage, THD current, current and voltage waveforms, powers kW, kVAR, kVA, power factor, voltage and current vectors for the short and long time (Cepisca et al., 2004); (Cepisca et al., 2006).

One example of measurement equipment is a multifunctional Power Quality Analyzer METREL, shown in Figure 9, one advanced instrument for measuring quality of electrical power in compliance with the EN60150. It incorporates a number of different measurement instruments for calculating various electrical parameters which is based on current and voltage measurements.

Fig. 9. Measurement equipment METREL

5.2 Results of the measurements in a real electric installation of EAF
The electrical power networks of arc furnaces are presented in Figure 10 (Cepisca et al., 2008).

Fig. 10. Electrical power supply networks for arc furnaces

5.2.1 The real measurements of voltage and current harmonics, and of the powers
Figure 11 presents the current (a), the voltage (b) and Figure 12 presents the powers for a technological cycle of arc furnace. This cycle presents two phases: melting phase (6-8 minutes) and phase of stable arc burning (12-15 minutes). The electrical quantities are strong variation in the melting phase, with an important voltage fall. In the phase of stable arc burning the variation of electrical quantities are more reduced (Cepisca et. al., (2007); (Grigorescu et al., 2006); (Grigorescu et al., 2009); (***PE, 2004).

Fig. 11. The real measurements for a technological cycle of EAF: a) current b) voltage
Fig. 12. The real measurements of powers (P, Q, S) for a technological cycle of arc furnace

5.2.2 The real measurements of wave forms of voltage and current, and of the THDU and THDI for melting phase of the technological cycle of arc furnace
As regard to the wave forms of the voltages, shown in Figure 13, a, and, respectively the wave forms of the currents shown in Figure 13, b, on the 30 kV voltage supply line in the melting phase is found a strong distortion of currents.

Fig. 13. The wave forms of voltages and currents in the melting phase

The Figure 14 presents: (a) the total harmonic distortion calculated for voltages (THDU, 2,8…3%), and (b) the total harmonic distortion calculated for the currents (THDI, 10….11%).

Fig. 14. The total harmonic distortion calculated for voltages (THDU) and currents (THDI) in
the melting phase

5.2.3 The real measurements of wave forms of voltage and current, and of the THDU and THDI in the phase of arc burning of the technological cycle of arc furnace
In the phase of the electric arc stable burning (Figure 15, a, and b), that appears towards the final of the heat’s making, is found that the distortion that appear in the currents and voltages wave forms are more reduced. In this phase, the amplitude of the three phase currents and voltages are closer as value, fact which shows that the load impedance is more balanced.

Fig. 15. The wave forms in the arc stable phase: a) voltages ; b) currents .

The TDH for voltages and for currents in the arc stable phase are presented in Figure 16, a, and b. We observe that in the arc stable phase the THDU is reduced (1…2%) and THDU are an acceptable value (4…5%). One can reach to the conclusion that the deformation of the current and voltage waves is smaller in the stable burning phase also by the fact that the distorting power is smaller in this phase, in conditions where the apparent, active and reactive power is higher.

As regard the voltage on the 30 kV line, in the melting phase one can observe the presence of the important harmonics while in the oxidation phase is found practically only the presence of the fundamental. In the current’s case, the important values of harmonics demonstrate that in this phase the current is strongly deformed.

Fig. 16. The total harmonic distortion calculated for voltages (THDU) and currents (THDI) in
the arc stable phase

The variation form of powers measured values presented on the heat time presents in the first period, corresponding to the melting phase, a smaller apparent power. The electrodes are more lifted-up, in order to ensure protection against breaking and this determining a smaller value current. In the stable phase the apparent power is approximately constant and higher than in the melting phase. The variation of the voltage, as well as of the arc current, is reflected partially in the variation of active and reactive powers during the heat.

5.2.4 The variation of the THDU and THDI, and the variation of the power factor
The THDU and THDI (Figure 17) are higher in the melting phase than in the stable burning phase, bat the reactive power is higher in the stable phase than in the melting phase.

Fig. 17. The variation of THDI and THDU

The power factor value (Figure 18) is higher in the stable arc phase and lower during the melting phase. For this reason results that on the 30 kV line the currents wave is more distorted than the voltages wave.

In different moments of technological process, following the measurements, were obtained values for THDI within 1-21% for current and 1-6% for voltage. Comparing these values with the standard results that the furnace is not matched in the national and international standards.

Fig. 18. The variation of power factor
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***SREN. (1998). SREN 50160, Characteristics of supplied voltage in public distribution networks, October, 1998
***EN. (2004). Standard EN50160-Power Quality Application Guide, Voltage Disturbance, July 2004.
***CMP. (1987). Understanding electric arc furnace operations for steel production, Center for Metals Production-CMP, vol.3, no.2, 1987

General Reference Common Power Quality Problems and Solutions

Published by Electrotek Concepts, Inc., PQSoft Case Study: General Reference Common Power Quality Problems and Solutions, Document ID: PQS0315, Date: July 18, 2003.


Abstract: Power quality is a frequently used term that means different things to different people. Common power quality problems include all of the issues that arise from the incompatibility between a utility’s power and the customer’s energy-using equipment that result in impaired operation. These include transients, sags and swells, harmonics, and short- and long-term voltage variations and outages. Also included under this broad area are issues of power reliability.

This document provides a brief summary of common power quality problems and solutions.

COMMON POWER QUALITY PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

Power quality is a frequently used term that means different things to different people. Common power quality problems include all of the issues that arise from the incompatibility between a utility’s power and the customer’s energy-using equipment that result in impaired operation. These include transients, sags and swells, harmonics, and short- and long-term voltage variations and outages. Also included under this broad area are issues of power reliability.

Power quality variations occur when the voltage waveform supplied to the customer deviates from normal. These deviations may involve changes in the voltage level (rms variations), changes in the voltage sinusoidal shape (harmonics, notching, and transients), or loss of power altogether (interruptions and outages). To some extent, the power system is constantly experiencing power quality variations because the supplied voltage is never a perfect sinusoid. When these variations are so significant, however, that customer equipment is adversely affected; the quality of service supplied becomes an issue that should be investigated. In addition, the current trend toward more energy efficient electronic devices has greatly increased the sensitivity of customer load equipment. As a result, power variations that once went unnoticed now result in mis-operation of customer devices. The impact of these power quality related problems can vary significantly. For example, a VCR could miss recording a program or a semiconductor manufacturer could lose product worth hundreds of thousands of dollars during the same momentary interruption event. Events such as these adversely affect all involved parties. The customer must absorb the initial economic impact of the power quality disturbance, but the electricity supplier and the public are affected economically in the long run as well.

Characterizing the Power Quality Environment

The relative importance of a particular category of power quality phenomena for a specific customer will depend on the type of installed electrical equipment. The type of interaction between customer equipment and the power quality phenomena – equipment damage, equipment/process trip, compromised product quality, etc. – and the frequency at which it occurs or could be expected to occur are also critical factors in the evaluation process once the cause has been identified. The range of power quality phenomena is defined by IEEE Std. 1159, Recommended Practice for Monitoring Electric Power Quality.

Approaches for resolving equipment or process problems related to each category of phenomena vary widely. Causes, impacts, and appropriate solutions for this range of electrical phenomena have been analyzed in numerous research and study efforts, resulting in the development of proven solution techniques for many common power quality problems. These efforts have also contributed to a prioritization of the power quality phenomena categories. From the customer’s point of view, the problem categories that are most important are those that:

  • have the highest negative impact on productivity, or
  • are difficult to diagnose and characterize, or
  • are more difficult and/or expensive to resolve.

Using these criteria, research and case study investigations have identified the following categories of power quality phenomena to be of highest importance to customers:

  • rms voltage variations, especially sags and interruptions
  • transients, especially utility capacitor switching transients
  • harmonic distortion , especially resonance conditions

This does not mean that there are never problems associated with other categories of power quality phenomena. Experience does indicate, however, that the majority of problems (especially from the custom’s perspective) are those listed above.

RMS Voltage Variations

Most customers recognize that electric power outages can never be cost-effectively eliminated. Distribution system reliability in the United States is very high, reflecting the fact that actual electric service interruptions are very infrequent, perhaps just once or twice per year. Voltage variations of short duration are not as well understood and do occur with a much higher frequency that actual service interruptions. Sometimes the duration is so short as to be almost imperceptible to the naked eye. However, modern process equipment and processes are more discerning than the naked eye, and will misoperate or even shut down in response to such voltage variations. This reaction, coupled with the relatively high rate of occurrence and the general high cost and complexity of typical solutions, make short term voltage variations one of the most, if not the most, important categories of power quality phenomena from the customer’s point of view.

IEEE Std. 1346, IEEE Recommended Practice for Evaluating Electric Power System Compatibility with Electronic Process Equipment, and IEEE Std. 1250, IEEE Guide for Service to Equipment Sensitive to Momentary Voltage Disturbances provide guidance for evaluating the impact of rms variation events on customer systems.

Figure 1 illustrates an example of a distribution system momentary interruption event. This waveform was recorded with a power quality disturbance analyzer.

Figure 1 – Example Distribution System Momentary Interruption Event

Transients

Transient overvoltages caused by switching operations or lightning strikes to electric facilities have significant potential to damage electric power equipment or disrupt operation. High-frequency transients (most impulsive transients and low- and medium-frequency oscillatory transients) have been recognized from some time as a threat to electronic equipment, and have been blamed for a wide range of failures and misoperations. Fortunately, these transients are relatively easy to protect against, and a wide range of off-the-shelf and inexpensive transient voltage surge suppressor (TVSS) products can be applied by either the customer or equipment manufacturer.

Low frequency oscillatory transients, on the other hand, are more difficult to treat. Switching (energizing) of utility shunt capacitor banks is the most common source of low-to-medium frequency transients on the electric power system. Unlike the other subcategories of transient phenomena, these are usually of modest magnitudes but contain substantial energy, so their effects can be felt quite far electrically from the point of origin. Low frequency transients have been strongly correlated with nuisance tripping of power electronic equipment, especially common types of adjustable-speed drives.

IEEE Std. 1036, Guide for the Application of Shunt Power Capacitors, provides a helpful overview to utility capacitor switching.

Figure 2 illustrates an example of a distribution bus voltage during a utility capacitor energizing event. The resulting overvoltage is approximately 1.35 per-unit (135%). Typical magnitudes for this type of event range from 1.2 to 1.8 per-unit and the resulting energizing frequencies generally fall in the range from 300 to 1000 Hz. This transient waveform was recorded with a power quality disturbance analyzer.

Figure 2 – Example Utility Capacitor Energizing Event

Harmonic Distortion

Harmonics are probably more strongly associated with power quality than any other category. It is somewhat surprising to those only casually involved in power quality that harmonics are not a chronic problem that the typical customer must deal with. Harmonics can cause equipment to misoperate, capacitor banks to fail, breakers to trip mysteriously, but in general, the electric power system has the ability to absorb substantial amounts of harmonic current with surprisingly little or no impact on connected equipment. Real problems from harmonics are usually confined to locations with high amounts of nonlinear, harmonic current-producing loads. Examples of this include a wastewater treatment plant where the entire load may be comprised of adjustable-speed motor drives powering pumps, or situations where power factor correction capacitors on the customer system or at the utility distribution level create resonances that amplify the effects of nonlinear loads. The fraction of electric power system load that produces harmonics currents has steadily increased over the past two decades.

IEEE Std. 519, IEEE Recommended Practice and Requirements for Harmonic Control in Electric Power Systems includes guidelines on establishing and using harmonic voltage and current limits on the power system. The basic philosophy of the standard is that the customer is responsible for limiting the amount of harmonic currents injected onto the overall power system and the utility is responsible for avoiding conditions on the power system that could create unacceptable voltage distortion levels (e.g., resonance).

Figure 3 illustrates an example of a dc drive current waveform. This waveform was simulated using Electrotek’s SuperHarmTM program.

Figure 3 – Example DC Drive Current Waveform

Economic Impacts of Power Quality

The ultimate reason that we are interested in power quality is economic value. There are economic impacts on utilities, their customers, and suppliers of load equipment. The quality of power can have a direct economic impact on many industrial consumers. There has recently been a great emphasis on revitalizing industry with more automation. This usually means electronically controlled, energy-efficient equipment which is often much more sensitive to deviations in the supply voltage than its electromechanical predecessors (e.g., adjustable-speed drives vs. induction motors). Thus, like the blinking clock in residences, industrial customers are now more acutely aware of minor disturbances on the power system. There can be significant costs associated with these disturbances. For example, it is conceivable for a single, commonplace, momentary utility breaker operation to result in a $10,000 loss to an average-sized industrial customer by shutting down a production line that requires four hours to restart.

The electric utility is concerned about power quality issues as well. Meeting customer expectations and maintaining customer confidence is a strong motivator. With today’s movement toward competition between utilities, it is more important than ever. The loss of a dissatisfied customer to a competing power supplier can have a very significant impact financially on a utility. Load equipment suppliers generally find themselves in a very competitive market with most customers buying on lowest cost. Thus, there is a general disincentive to add features to the equipment to withstand common disturbances unless the customer specifies otherwise. Many manufacturers are also unaware of the types of disturbances that can occur on power system.

The primary responsibility for correcting inadequacies in load equipment ultimately lies with the customers that must purchase and operate it. Specifications must include power performance criteria. Since many customers are also unaware of the pitfalls, one useful service that utilities can provide is dissemination of information on power quality and the requirements of load equipment to properly operate in the real world.

Factors that Influence Costs

Besides the obvious financial impacts on both utilities and industrial customers, there are numerous indirect and intangible costs associated with power quality problems. Residential customers typically do not suffer direct financial loss or the inability to earn income because of most power quality problems, but they can be a potent force when they perceive that the utility is providing poor service. The sheer number of complaints requires utilities to provide staffing to handle them. In addition, public interest groups frequently intervene with public service commissions, requiring the utilities to expend financial resources on lawyers, consultants, studies and the like to counter the intervention. While all of this is certainly not the result of power quality problems, a reputation for providing poor quality service does not help matters.

As with many power quality problems, an economic evaluation is often difficult to complete since it is often very difficult to determine the cost of a particular event for an individual customer. In addition, these costs may vary drastically from customer to customer. There are a number of aspects of customer production that can be affected by a power quality event, including:

  1. Lost Production – factory costs associated with the production process being disrupted.
  2. Scrap – costs associated with product that must be scrapped and cannot be recovered by recycling the raw materials.
  3. Restart – costs associated with restarting the production process.
  4. Labor – extra labor costs associated with restarting the product line, reloading machines, cleaning up scrap, etc.
  5. Repair – costs for repair of machines and equipment damaged during the transient event.
  6. Replacement – costs for the replacement of machinery damaged during the transient event.
  7. Process Inefficiency – costs due to the process not begin able to run to its optimal efficiency.
  8. Demand Charges – increased utility charges because the customer is unable to operate equipment such as capacitors and adjustable-speed drives that might reduce demand charges.

Each event that impacts a customer’s production will include a number of these costs. Predicting the exact economic impact is nearly impossible due to the large number of system parameters that can affect the characteristics of the event. It is entirely possible, however, that a single event could generate losses sufficient to justify the additional mitigation equipment expenditure.

Common Power Quality Problems and Solutions

Customers often blame utilities for most power quality problems, but the fact is that problems may originate on either side of the meter. There are four sources for most customer-encountered problems:

  1. Natural phenomena (e.g., inclement weather)
  2. Normal utility operations (e.g., automatic protection system operations)
  3. Neighboring customers (e.g., welding equipment adjacent to an office)
  4. Customer’s own equipment and facilities (e.g., motor starting).

Within a customer’s facility, poor power quality can result from incompatible equipment interactions or from poor wiring and grounding practices. In fact, many power quality problems are associated with customers’ wiring and grounding practices. Problems such as voltage sags, however, generally originate on the utility’s side of the meter. In addition, the proliferation of harmonic (nonlinear) producing loads is resulting in power quality problems for both customers and the utilities that serve them. These loads include adjustable-speed drives, electronic ballasts for fluorescent lighting, electric arc furnaces, computers distributed throughout commercial and industrial facilities, and other electronic technologies.

Identifying Power Quality Problems

The first step is to understand how customers perceive power quality problems. Customers rarely see or understand these problems. They see symptoms of them and the resulting difficulties in their businesses and homes. Some of the more common symptoms include:

  • Equipment damage
  • Blinking digital displays
  • Data or information loss / software glitches
  • Loss of instructional programming and controller timing
  • An abnormal number of service calls on sensitive equipment
  • Disk drive problems / computers re-booting
  • Static shock

In addition to the observed symptoms, it is important to determine the customer equipment that is affected by the power quality event. Some of the most important equipment categories to consider include:

  • Adjustable-speed drives – harmonic distortion concerns
  • Adjustable-speed drives – sensitivity to transient voltages
  • Electronic controls, adjustable-speed drives, robotics, and programmable logic controllers – sensitivity to voltage sags
  • Switch-mode power supplies – harmonic current generation and neutral current concerns
  • Fluorescent lighting (especially with electronic ballasts) – harmonic generation
  • Power factor correction capacitors – switching transients and magnification
  • Power factor correction capacitors – harmonic distortion concerns (resonance)
  • Motor contactors – sensitivity to voltage sags
  • Power conditioning equipment selection – matching to requirements of protected equipment
  • Data processing equipment – UPS system specification
  • Electronic equipment – sensitivity to high frequency transients
  • Transformers – harmonic heating
  • Motors – voltage imbalances and harmonic heating

Once information regarding the symptoms and affected equipment is collected, the power quality event causing the problem can be determined. A number of common power quality issues include:

  • Voltage sags due to faults on parallel circuits on the same distribution system or faults on the transmission system.
  • Voltage sags due to motor starting.
  • Momentary interruptions at industrial and commercial installations due to recloser operations on feeder circuit breakers.
  • Voltage flicker from arc furnace and arc welding loads.
  • Voltage transients caused by circuit switching and load switching within the customer facility.
  • Transient voltage magnification at low voltage capacitor banks.
  • Sensitivity of adjustable-speed drives and control systems to utility capacitor switching transients.
  • Transients and notching associated with power electronics equipment operation.
  • Coupled voltages at customer facilities due to lightning transients on the primary distribution systems.
  • Harmonic distortion from adjustable-speed drives or other nonlinear loads.
  • Transformer heating caused by harmonic current levels.
  • Neutral conductor overloading due to harmonic producing loads in commercial installations.

Determining Power Quality Solutions

Lessons learned from numerous research and case study projects have revealed the following fundamental steps for optimized, cost-effective solutions to power quality problems:

  1. Identify affected equipment/process.
  2. Identify nature of electrical disturbance affecting equipment.
  3. Calculate or project economic impact.
  4. Select mitigation technologies based on nature of electrical disturbance.
  5. Determine benefit/cost ratio for solution alternatives.
  6. Select appropriate solution based on technical and economic evaluation.
  7. Design solution application.
  8. Specify and procure selected solution product.
  9. Install and commission solution equipment.
  10. Evaluate/validate performance.

Not every step is necessarily mandatory or even applicable to every case. Sometimes the correct solution is more obvious, possibly even based on previous experience, and much of the problem identification/characterization effort can be bypassed. The procedure outlined does, however, illustrate the breadth and depth of knowledge required to maximize the chances of a cost-effective solution.

Challenges for the Customer

Unfortunately, the range of required expertise and background knowledge is almost never immediately available to a customer unless there has been a previous and substantial internal investment in building such capability. Outside organizations with the requisite experience and skill must often be enlisted.

When a problem is encountered, customers have an immediate feel for the impact on the bottom line, and sometimes may be able to trace the problem down to specific equipment components of the overall affected process. The urgency associated with resolving the problem and restoring production can lead to band-aid solutions, or worse, actions that result only in wasted effort and expense and do not improve the situation at all.

The solution process previously outlined is designed to prevent band-aids. Many of the steps and interim questions to answer can be beyond the skills and expertise of the customer. Examples of this include:

  • In some cases, the customer may not be able to identify affected equipment; a single observation or problem may reveal only the most sensitive link in the process chain, where a solution specific to that component would only expose other parts of the production chain when more severe disturbances occur.
  • While the customer most likely knows or could calculate the cost of a single event, they may not be able to project impact over time since this will relate to frequency and characteristics of electrical disturbance, for which they have no information.
  • A customer may not have detailed specifications or electrical requirements for components or equipment that make up their process. Respective vendors may have such information, but seeking out each of them can be a daunting task.
  • Customers may not be aware of the appropriate solution technologies, making them more susceptible to marketing claims from solution vendors.
  • Customers may not have the necessary technical and/or engineering expertise to select, design, and specify a solution.
  • With limited technical resources and staff that is often over utilized, there is often no evaluation or validation of a solution once commissioned.
  • Power quality problems may not be isolated or stand-alone. For example, combinations of problems or careful analysis of equipment/process requirements versus electric supply characteristics sometimes points to a solution different than what might be indicated for a single observed occurrence.

When a customer experiences production problems that are suspected to be related to power quality, the electric service provider (utility) and the manufacturer(s) of the affected equipment are many times the first contacts made for assistance.

Common Power Quality Solutions

The best power quality solutions are in general site-specific and potentially unique to the affected plant or process. Most problems involving one of the aforementioned power quality phenomena are difficult to resolve with off-the-shelf solution products, except for instances where the load is small in size and has no or limited interaction with other process equipment. This is, however, a trivial case, and most real problems involve a range of equipment interconnected in some fashion to constitute the process.

In applying a solution product, is it necessary to not only determine what type of technology, but also where it should be applied, in what size, and to what portions of the overall process. Sometimes determining what needs to be protected is a difficult challenge. Once determined, how and where the solution should best be applied can be a difficult proposition. The financial objective in solving power quality problems is to earn an acceptable return on investment or meet certain payback criteria.

A number of common power quality solutions include:

RMS Voltage Variations

  • Faults on the power system are the ultimate cause of both momentary interruptions and voltage sags. Any measures taken to reduce the likelihood of a fault will help reduce the incidence of sags and interruptions to customers. These measures can include using underground circuits, tree trimming, insulator washing, and increased application of surge arresters for lightning protection on distribution circuits.
  • It is possible to make the equipment being used in customer facilities less sensitive to voltage sags and momentary interruptions. Clocks and controls with low power requirements can be protected with a small battery or large capacitor to provide ride-through capability. Motor control relays and contactors can be selected with less sensitive voltage sag thresholds. Controls can be set less sensitive to voltage sags unless the actual process requires an extremely tight voltage tolerance. This solution requires coordination with equipment manufacturers but the trend seems to be in the direction of increased ride-through capability. For instance, most programmable logic controllers use switched-mode power supplies that have a ride through capability of about four cycles. Therefore, it should not be necessary to trip these controllers under short voltage sag conditions.
  • Power conditioning equipment can be applied at the individual loads that are sensitive to voltage sags and/or interruptions. The power conditioning requirements depend on the types of voltage sags that can be expected and the possible durations of interruptions:
    • Voltage sags down to approximately 60% of nominal voltage can be handled with constant voltage transformers (CVTs – also known as ferroresonant transformers).
    • For voltage sag protection of larger loads, magnetic synthesizers or motor-generators can be used. Magnetic synthesizers can ride through voltage sags down to about 60% of nominal and provide voltage regulation.
    • Motor-generator sets also help ride through voltage sag conditions due to the inertia of the motor and generator. However, standard motor-generators can only ride through a couple cycles of a complete interruption. The addition of a flywheel (increased inertia) can increase the ride through capability to 1-2 seconds. This may be sufficient to handle many momentary interruption problems.
    • For the most part, uninterruptible power supply (UPS) systems are required if equipment must be completely protected from interruptions. If momentary interruptions are the only problem (as opposed to long duration outages), the UPS system can be designed with minimum battery backup. Larger battery systems (to provide backup for interruptions lasting up to 15 minutes) can be designed if longer duration interruptions are anticipated.
    • For short duration interruptions and voltage sags (less than 2 seconds), superconducting storage devices and other power-electronic-based devices (Custom Power) are being developed to protect entire plants or portions of larger plants at the service entrance.
  • Starting motors can cause voltage sags and other voltage variation problems such as flicker if the motor is started frequently. Alternative starting techniques, such as autotransformer starters, resistance and reactance starters, part-winding starters, and delta-wye starters may be applied if the voltage sag during starting impacts the system or adjacent equipment

Transients

  • Utility capacitor switching can be a particular problem for customers that have low voltage power factor correction capacitors. These low voltage capacitors can magnify the switching transients, causing failure of arresters and electronic equipment within the facility. Using a tuned filter for shunt compensation can solve this problem.
  • Utility capacitor switching can also cause nuisance tripping of small adjustable-speed drives. These drives have dc capacitors that allow a current surge and resulting increase in the dc link voltage during the capacitor switching transient. The drive protection circuit trips on dc overvoltage. A series choke (or reactor or isolation transformer) can be used to solve this problem.
  • Most high frequency transients occurring within customer facilities do not have significant energy associated with them (e.g., less than 1 Joule). This means that equipment can be protected with simple surge protection devices (varistors, silicon avalanche diodes, etc.). It is important that the transient voltage withstand capabilities of the equipment be coordinated with the protective levels of the devices used for protection.
  • Power electronic devices and other electronic equipment can be sensitive to the transient voltage rate-of-rise as well as the magnitude. These devices can be protected with a series filter (choke) in addition to standard surge protectors. Many hybrid types of surge protectors include a series choke for this purpose.
  • Lightning transients can be a particular problem for customer equipment. Lightning surge currents being conducted to ground create a ground potential rise (GPR) that can cause significant ground potential differences between different locations within a facility. When proper grounding practices are followed, this should not be a safety hazard. However, the ground potential differences can cause problems with communications and data processing equipment that has multiple ground references. Sometimes, only optical isolation can prevent these problems.
  • Low voltage side current surge phenomena is a particular concern for residential customers. Currents in the transformer secondary winding during lightning surges also flow through the customer loads. Efforts to protect the transformer can make the surge at the customer service more severe. A coordinated approach involving secondary arresters at the pole and the service entrance is required to solve this problem.

Harmonic Distortion

  • Almost all harmonic distortion problems occur when a resonant frequency exists near the 5th or 7th harmonic (11th or 13th harmonics can also be a problem if a large percentage of the load is nonlinear). Simple calculations can often be used to determine the system resonant frequencies. Existence of resonances near characteristic harmonic frequencies of loads that have been identified as harmonic sources is an early indication of potential trouble. If a harmonic resonance is discovered, possible solutions include
    • Ungrounding wye-connected capacitor banks (this is often used to solve telephone interference problems).
    • Changing capacitor bank sizes and/or locations (this is often one the least expensive options for both utilities and industrial customers).
    • Adding a reactor to an existing capacitor bank (has the effect of detuning the system).
    • Adding a harmonic filter bank – The most common filter is a single-tuned passive filter. The passive shunt filter works by short-circuiting the harmonic currents as close to the source of distortion as practical. This keeps the currents out of the supply system and alters the resonant frequency of the system.
    • Controlling the capacitor switching scheme to avoid the resonance.
  • Harmonic distortion can also be reduced with the application of active filters. Active filters work by electronically supplying the harmonic component of the current into a nonlinear load.
  • Harmonic currents magnitudes for a number of nonlinear customer loads can be reduced with the addition of a series choke.
  • Transformer connections can be used to reduce harmonic currents in three-phase systems. Phase-shifting half of the 6-pulse power converters in a plant load by 30 degrees can approximate the benefits 12-pulse loads by reducing the 5th and 7th harmonic currents. Delta-connected transformers can block the flow of zero-sequence harmonics (typically triplens) from the line. Zigzag and grounding transformers can shunt the triplens off the line.
  • Harmonic control on distribution feeders can often be achieved with the installation of a number of distributed harmonic filters near the end of the feeders.

REFERENCES

IEEE Standard 100. Terms and Definitions
IEEE Standard 1100. IEEE Recommended Practice for Powering and Grounding Sensitive Equipment (The Emerald Book).
IEEE Standard 1159. IEEE Recommended Practice on Monitoring Electric Power Quality.


RELATED STANDARDS
IEEE Standard 1159
IEEE Standard 1346
IEEE Standard 1250
IEEE Standard 1036
IEEE Standard 519

GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS
ASD: Adjustable-Speed Drive
CVT: Constant Voltage Transformer
GPR: Ground Potential Rise
IEEE: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
MOV: Metal Oxide Varistor
PWM: Pulse Width Modulation
TVSS: Transient Voltage Surge Suppressors
UPS: Uninterruptible Power Supply
VCR: Video Cassette Recorder

Am I not safe from harmonics if I use K-Rated transformers and oversized neutrals?

Published by Mirus International Inc., [2010-01-08] MIRUS-FAQ001-B2, FAQ’s Harmonic Mitigating Transformers, 31 Sun Pac Blvd., Brampton, Ontario, Canada. L6S 5P6.


K-Rated transformers made their appearance several years ago as a means of preventing transformers from failing when subjected to heavy non-linear loading. They are essentially ‘beefed up’ transformers with extra steel in their cores and copper in their windings to allow for better dissipation of the excessive losses produced by harmonic currents. They are not designed to cancel harmonics or their fluxes and therefore, do nothing but protect themselves from overheating. Harmonic losses are normally not significantly reduced and voltage distortion will typically remain quite high under more heavily loaded conditions. To improve power quality in the form of reduced voltage distortion and to save energy costs, the use of a transformer designed to cancel harmonics is necessary.

Over-sizing neutrals, on the other hand, can be a reasonably low cost method for the prevention of neutral conductor overheating. It is important to remember that the non-linear loads are the source of the harmonic currents. They must flow from the loads back to the transformer. Because the 3rd and 9th current harmonics created by the 120 VAC switch-mode power supplies are flowing back on the neutral, the neutral current is usually larger than the phase currents (learn more). This is of minimal consequence provided the neutral has suitable ampacity to carry the extra current and the 120/208V 4-wire run length is not too long.

A point of caution. When selecting phase and neutral conductor sizes in a non-linear load application, the electrical code requires that an ampacity adjustment or correction factor be applied. This is because the neutral conductor is considered to be a current carrying conductor along with PhA, PhB and PhC. With more than 3 current carrying conductors in a conduit or raceway, a 0.8 factor must be applied.

To minimize harmonic problems in new installations, avoid the old approach of using a large central transformer with a 120/208V secondary and long 4-wire risers or radial runs through the building. The impedances of these long runs are high so that harmonic currents flowing through these impedances will create high levels of voltage distortion and neutral-to-ground voltage. To prevent these problems, an effective rule of thumb is to limit each 120/208V run length to that which would produce a 60Hz voltage drop not greater than 1/2% to 3/4%. For a typical 200 amp feeder this would be < 50 ft.

Combining the use of Harmonic Mitigating Transformers with short 120/208V feeder runs and double ampacity neutrals will ensure compatibility between the distribution system and the non-linear loads. Generally this will keep voltage distortion safely below the maximum of 5% as recommended for sensitive loads in IEEE Std 519-1992.


Harmonics and Harmonic Mitigating Transformers (HMT’s) Questions and Answers

This document has been written to provide answers to the more frequently asked questions we have received regarding harmonics and the Harmonic Mitigating Transformer technology used to address them. This information will be of interest to both those experienced in harmonic mitigation techniques and those new to the problem of harmonics. For additional information visit our Website at www.mirusinternational.com.

Why is Good Power Quality Necessary?

Published by Merus Power Plc., October 13, 2016


Power quality is commonly defined as the power grid’s ability to supply a clean and stable power flow as a constantly available power supply. The power flow should have a pure sinusoidal wave form and it should remain within specified voltage and frequency tolerances. Why is good power quality necessary?

Power quality is commonly defined as the power grid’s ability to supply a clean and stable power flow as a constantly available power supply. The power flow should have a pure sinusoidal wave form and it should remain within specified voltage and frequency tolerances. No real-life power source is ideal.

In today’s electrical networks, deviations from these ideal conditions are frequent due to increasing non-linear and other loads disturbing the grid. Power generation is also becoming more complex with new players and technologies entering the business, which used to be a fairly stable operating environment. All this adds new challenges to power grid operators.

The consequences of insufficient power quality can inflict serious losses on business and economy. In the worst-case scenario, it may pose a threat to human life in mission critical applications and highly sensitive environments, such as hospitals.

Good power quality saves money and energy. Direct savings to consumers come from lower energy cost and reactive power tariffs. Indirect savings are gained by avoiding circumstances such as damage and premature aging of equipment, loss of production or loss of data and work. Power quality can affect the overall company performance, which is a fact easily overlooked by the management.

Source: Why is good power quality necessary – Merus Power

General Reference – Power Quality Glossary

Published by Electrotek Concepts, Inc., PQSoft Case Study: General Reference – Power Quality Glossary, Document ID: PQS0305, Date: January 27, 2003.


Abstract: The document provides a glossary of terms related to power quality analysis and measurements.

POWER QUALITY GLOSSARY

Glossary

Active Filter:
A power electronics-based device configured with controls to provide cancellation of harmonic current components created by nonlinear loads.

Area of Vulnerability:
Defined with respect to the voltage sag sensitivity of a particular end user or equipment, this is the area of the power system where a fault can cause misoperation of the end user equipment.

Average Maximum Demand Load Current (IL):
Maximum load current expected for an end user at the point of common coupling. IEEE Standard 519-1992 recommends that this current be calculated as the average of the maximum demand currents for a twelve-month period.

Capacitor Switching Voltage Magnification:
The phenomena where the transient voltage during energizing of a capacitor bank is magnified at a lower voltage capacitor bank due to system resonance conditions.

Common Mode Voltage:
The noise voltage that appears equally and in phase from each current-carrying conductor to ground.

Commercial Power:
Electrical power furnished by the electric power utility company.

Constant Voltage Transformer (CVT):
A ferroresonant transformer used for voltage regulation in single-phase applications.

Coupling:
Circuit element or elements, or network, that may be considered common to the input mesh and the output mesh and through which energy may be transferred from one to the other.

Current Transformer (CT):
An instrument transformer intended to have its primary winding connected in series with the conductor carrying the current to be measured or controlled.

Dip:
Another term for Sag, commonly used in Europe.

Distortion Factor (DF):
The ratio of the root-mean-square of the harmonic content to the root-mean-square value of the fundamental quantity, expressed as a percent of the fundamental. Also known as Total Harmonic Distortion (THD).

Dropout:
A loss of equipment operation (discrete data signals) due to noise, sag, or interruption.

Dropout Voltage:
The voltage at which a device will release to its de-energized position (for this document, the voltage at which a device fails to operate).

Eddy Current Loss Factor (PEC-R):
The portion of a transformer’s total losses that can be attributed to eddy currents, expressed in per unit or percent of the total transformer losses at full load conditions.

Electromagnetic Compatibility:
The ability of a device, equipment or system to function satisfactorily in its electromagnetic
environment without introducing intolerable electromagnetic disturbances to anything in that environment.

Electromagnetic Disturbance:
Any electromagnetic phenomena which may degrade the performance of a device, equipment or system, or adversely affect living or inert matter.

Electromagnetic Environment:
The totality of electromagnetic phenomena existing at a given location.

Electromagnetic Susceptibility:
The inability of a device, equipment or system to perform without degradation in the presence of an electromagnetic disturbance. Note: Susceptibility is a lack of immunity.

Equipment Grounding Conductor:
The conductor used to connect the non-current carrying parts of conduits, raceways, and equipment enclosures to the grounded conductor (neutral) and the grounding electrode at the service equipment (main panel) or secondary of a separately derived system (e.g., isolation transformer). See NFPA 70-1990, Section 100 [B12].

Flicker:
Impression of unsteadiness of visual sensation induced by a light stimulus whose luminance or spectral distribution fluctuates with time.

Frequency Deviation:
An increase or decrease in the power frequency. The duration of a frequency deviation can be from several cycles to several hours.

Fundamental (Component):
The component of an order 1 (50 Hz or 60 Hz) of the Fourier series of a periodic quantity.

Ground:
A conducting connection, whether intentional or accidental, by which an electric circuit or equipment is connected to the ground, or to some conducting body of relatively large extent that serves in place of the ground. Note: It is used for establishing and maintaining the potential of the ground (or of the conducting body) or approximately that potential, on conductors connected to it, and for conducting ground currents to and from ground (or the conducting body).

Ground Loop:
In a radial grounding system, an undesired conducting path between two conductive bodies that are already connected to a common (single-point) ground.

Harmonic (component):
A component of order greater than one of the Fourier series of a periodic quantity.

Harmonic Content:
The quantity obtained by subtracting the fundamental component from an alternating quantity.

Immunity (to a disturbance):
The ability of a device, equipment or system to perform without degradation in the presence of an electromagnetic disturbance.

Impulse:
A pulse that, for a given application, approximates a unit pulse. When used in relation to the monitoring of power quality, it is preferred to use the term impulsive transient in place of impulse.

Impulsive transient:
A sudden non-power frequency change in the steady state condition of voltage or current that is unidirectional in polarity (primarily either positive or negative).

Instantaneous:
When used to quantify the duration of a short duration variation as a modifier, refers to a time range from 0.5 cycles to 30 cycles of the power frequency.

Interharmonic (component):
A frequency component of a periodic quantity that is not an integer multiple of the frequency at which the supply system is operating (e.g., 50 Hz or 60 Hz).

Interruption, Momentary:
A type of short duration variation. The complete loss of voltage (<0.1 pu) on one or more phase conductors for a time period between 0.5 cycles and 3 seconds.

Interruption, Sustained:
A type of long duration variation. The complete loss of voltage (<0.1 pu) on one of more phase conductors for a time greater than 1 minute.

Interruption, Temporary:
A type of short duration variation. The complete loss of voltage (<0.1 pu) on one or more phase conductors for a time period between 3 seconds and 1 minute.

Isolation:
Separation of one section of a system from undesired influences of other sections.

K-Factor (K):
A characteristic of a current waveform that weights harmonic components according to the square of the harmonic number.

Long Duration Variation:
See Variation, Long Duration.

Magnetic Synthesizer:
A transformer-based voltage regulator for three-phase loads.

Momentary:
When used to quantify the duration of a short duration variation as a modifier, refers to a time range at the power frequency from 30 cycles to 3 seconds.

Noise:
Unwanted electrical signals in the circuits of the control systems in which they occur.

Nominal Voltage. (Vn):
A nominal value assigned to a circuit or system for the purpose of conveniently designating its voltage class (as 208/120, 480/277, 600).

Nonlinear Load:
Steady state electrical load which draws current discontinuously or whose impedance varies throughout the cycle of the input ac voltage waveform.

Normal Mode Voltage:
A voltage that appears between or among active circuit conductors.

Notch:
A switching (or other) disturbance of the normal power voltage waveform, lasting less than 0.5 cycles, which is initially of opposite polarity than the waveform and is thus subtracted from the normal waveform in terms of the peak value of the disturbance voltage. This includes complete loss of voltage for up to 0.5 cycles.

Oscillatory Transient:
A sudden, non-power frequency change in the steady state condition of voltage or current that includes both positive or negative polarity value.

Overvoltage:
When used to describe a specific type of long duration variation, refers to a measured voltage having a value greater than the nominal voltage for a period of time greater than 1 minute. Typical values are 1.1 to 1.2 pu.

Phase Shift:
The displacement in time of one waveform relative to another of the same frequency and harmonic content.

Point of Common Coupling (PCC):
The point of interface between two different parts of the power system where the propagation and characteristics of a power quality variation can be evaluated. With respect to evaluation of harmonic voltage and current limits at the supply to an end user, this is the point on the system where another end user can be supplied.

Potential Transformer (PT); also, voltage transformer:
An instrument transformer intended to have its primary winding connected in shunt with a power-supply circuit, the voltage of which is to be measured or controlled.

Power Disturbance:
Any deviation from the nominal value (or from some selected thresholds) of the input ac power characteristics.

Power Quality:
The concept of powering and grounding sensitive equipment in a manner that is suitable to the operation of that equipment.

Sag:
A decrease in rms voltage or current at the power frequency for durations of 0.5 cycles to 1 minute. Typical values are 0.1 to 0.9 pu.

Service Voltage:
Voltage at the end user service entrance location.

Shield:
As normally applied to instrumentation cables, refers to a conductive sheath (usually metallic) applied, over the insulation of a conductor or conductors, for the purpose of providing means to reduce coupling between the conductors so shielded and other conductors which may be susceptible to, or which may be generating unwanted electrostatic or electromagnetic fields (noise).

Shielding:
Shielding is the use of a conducting and/or ferromagnetic barrier between a potentially disturbing noise source and sensitive circuitry. Shields are used to protect cables (data and power) and electronic circuits. They may be in the form of metal barriers, enclosures, or wrappings around source circuits and receiving circuits.

Short Duration Variation:
See Variation, Short Duration.

Slew Rate:
Rate of change of a quantity such as volts, frequency or temperature.

Static Var Compensator (SVC):
Configuration of reactive power compensation equipment (reactors and capacitors) with power electronics switching to achieve continuous control of the reactive compensation provided to the power system.

Sustained:
When used to quantify the duration of a voltage interruption, refers to the time frame associated with a long duration variation (i.e., greater than 1 minute).

Swell:
An increase in rms voltage or current at the power frequency for durations from 0.5 cycles to 1 minute. Typical values are 1.1 to 1.8 pu.

Temporary:
When used to quantify the duration of a short duration variation as a modifier, refers to a time range from 3 seconds to 1 minute.

Tolerance:
The allowable variation from a nominal value.

Total Demand Distortion (TDD):
The total (RSS) harmonic current distortion in % of the average maximum demand load current (15 or 30 minute demand).

Total Harmonic Distortion (THD):
The ratio of the root-mean-square of the harmonic content to the root-mean-square value of the fundamental quantity, expressed as a percent of the fundamental. Also referred to as Distortion Factor.

Transient:
Pertaining to or designating a phenomenon or a quantity which varies between two consecutive steady states during a time interval that is short compared to the time scale of interest. A transient can be a unidirectional impulse of either polarity or a damped oscillatory wave with the first peak occurring in either polarity.

Transmission Line Fault Performance:
The expected or actual number of faults per year (defined for each type of fault separately) on a transmission line.

Undervoltage:
When used to describe a specific type of long duration variation, refers to a measured voltage having a value less than the nominal voltage for a period of time greater than one minute. Typical values are 0.8 – 0.9 pu.

Utilization Voltage:
Voltage at end use equipment location.

Variation, Long Duration:
A variation of the rms value of the voltage from nominal voltage for a time greater than 1 minute. Usually further described using a modifier indicating the magnitude of a voltage variation (e.g., Undervoltage, Overvoltage, or Voltage Interruption).

Variation, Short Duration:
A variation of the rms value of the voltage from nominal voltage for a time greater than 0.5 cycles of the power frequency but less than or equal to 1 minute. Usually further described using a modifier indicating the magnitude of a voltage variation (e.g. Sag, Swell, or Interruption) and possibly a modifier indicating the duration of the variation (e.g., Instantaneous, Momentary or Temporary).

Voltage Change:
A variation of the rms or peak value of a voltage between two consecutive levels sustained for definite but unspecified durations.

Voltage Dip:
See Sag.

Voltage Distortion:
Any deviation from the nominal sine wave form of the ac line voltage.

Voltage Fluctuation:
A series of voltage changes or a cyclical variation of the voltage envelope. Voltage Imbalance (Unbalance), Polyphase Systems: The ratio of the negative or zero sequence

Voltage Imbalance (Unbalance), Polyphase Systems:
The ratio of the negative or zero sequence component to the positive sequence component, usually expressed as a percentage.

Voltage Interruption:
Disappearance of the supply voltage on one or more phases. Usually qualified by an additional term indicating the duration of the interruption (e.g., Momentary, Temporary, or Sustained).

Voltage Regulation:
The degree of control or stability of the rms voltage at the load. Often specified in relation to other parameters, such as input-voltage changes, load changes, or temperature changes.

Waveform Distortion:
A steady state deviation from an ideal sine wave of power frequency principally characterized by the spectral content of the deviation.

Terminology to Avoid

The following words have a varied history of usage, and some may have specific definitions for other applications.

blackout
frequency shift
blink
glitch
brownout

outage
clean ground
power surge
clean power
raw power
computer grade ground
raw utility power
counterpoise ground
shared ground
dedicated ground
spike
dirty ground
subcycle outages
dirty power
surge
wink

REFERENCES

IEEE Standard 100. Terms and Definitions
IEEE Standard 1100. IEEE Recommended Practice for Powering and Grounding Sensitive Equipment (The Emerald Book).
IEEE Standard 1159. IEEE Recommended Practice on Monitoring Electric Power Quality.
IEEE Standard 142. IEEE Recommended Practice for Grounding of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems. (The Green Book) Many of these definitions are also included in Appendix A.

Cyber-Physical System Security of a Power Grid: State-of-the-Art

Published by Chih-Che Sun 1, Chen-Ching Liu 1,2 and Jing Xie 1,*

1 School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164,
USA; csun@eecs.wsu.edu (C.-C.S.); liu@eecs.wsu.edu (C.-C.L.)
2 Visiting Professor, School of Mechanical and Materials Engineering, University College Dublin, Belfield,
Dublin 4, Ireland
*Correspondence: jxie@eecs.wsu.edu; Tel.: +1-509-339-4246
Academic Editors: Alfredo Vaccaro and Jin (Wei) Kocsis


Abstract

As part of the smart grid development, more and more technologies are developed and deployed on the power grid to enhance the system reliability. A primary purpose of the smart grid is to significantly increase the capability of computer-based remote control and automation. As a result, the level of connectivity has become much higher, and cyber security also becomes a potential threat to the cyber-physical systems (CPSs). In this paper, a survey of the state-of-the-art is conducted on the cyber security of the power grid concerning issues of: (1) the structure of CPSs in a smart grid; (2) cyber vulnerability assessment; (3) cyber protection systems; and (4) testbeds of a CPS. At Washington State University (WSU), the Smart City Testbed (SCT) has been developed to provide a platform to test, analyze and validate defense mechanisms against potential cyber intrusions. A test case is provided in this paper to demonstrate how a testbed helps the study of cyber security and the anomaly detection system (ADS) for substations.

Keywords: cyber security; cyber-physical system; intrusion detection; testbed; smart grid

1. Introduction

A primary purpose of the smart grid is to deploy digital communication networks (e.g., Ethernet, cellular service and satellite signal) to enable data acquisition and remote control between control centers and the large number of power grid facilities (e.g., substations and power plants). Due to the installation of intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) on power grids, power system operators are able to monitor and control a power system from a remote control center. These remote control and monitoring technologies are based on information and communications technology (ICT). As a result, vulnerabilities with respect to cyber intrusions also become a serious concern.

A massive cyber attack occurred on Ukraine’s power system in December 2015. More than ten thousand homes and facilities experienced a power outage for hours, even days. This attack was enabled by a malware called BlackEnergy installed on the control center computers [1]. This cyber intrusion event shows that attackers can damage a large-scale ICT network in a short time. In addition, cyber intruders, compared to physical intrusion events, are hard to locate. Cyber attackers can be anywhere with network access. Several Internet Protocol (IP) trace back technologies can be used to find the attack source by analyzing the packet information [2,3]. However, the techniques of modifying network packets and hijacking a victim’s computer can be achieved from many websites. Therefore, rather than the detection of the attack source, the main focus of cyber protection systems is on blocking the unknown connections from the wide area network (WAN), e.g., Internet, radio, cellular and mobile worldwide interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX). Nevertheless, cyber security leakages are usually related to the configuration settings of a communication system in a power grid.

In order to identify cyber security problems in power grids, research on vulnerability assessment is proposed to discover the weaknesses. The studies of protection systems, such as intrusion detection system (IDS) and ADS, are constructed to detect abnormal activities by capturing the signatures of cyber attacks. The sensitivity of protection systems is the key factor of false alarms. Both false positive and false negative alarms reduce the system’s performance. Thus, different kinds of testbeds for smart grids have been developed for several purposes, including testing and analyzing the impact of potential or existing cyber attacks, identifying a smart grid’s or a subsystems’ (e.g., substations and control centers) vulnerabilities and validating the capability of protection systems.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Physical and cyber structures and devices of smart grids are introduced in Section 2. Recent research on vulnerability assessment is presented. Various types of cyber protection systems, including ADSs and IDSs, and the false alarm issues are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the cyber-physical system (CPS) testbeds for testing and validating cyber security-related research. The conclusion is provided in Section 5.

2. Cyber Security Vulnerabilities and Communication Technologies in Power Grids

Measurements are collected by the control center for power system monitoring and control. In recent years, electronic devices and digital communication systems have been deployed on power grids. As a result, measurements and control commands can be delivered within a second or even milliseconds. The efficiency and reliability of power systems have been enhanced significantly with respect to the deployment of ICT. For example, phasor measurement units (PMUs) have been integrated and deployed for wide area measurement systems (WAMSs). In addition, advanced metering infrastructures (AMIs) have been installed on distribution systems [4].

In CPSs, the cyber and physical systems are coupled to provide critical services. As an example of CPSs, the smart grid utilizes massive information acquired from the physical system. Measurements are collected and analyzed by the cyber system and, in turn, affect the operation of the physical system by economic and remedial actions. Although the integration of cyber and physical systems is critical, new types of risks emerge from the tight coupling between the physical and cyber systems. On the one hand, the cyber system may adversely influence the physical system when cyber attacks are involved. For example, untimely and/or fake commands may damage the facilities or even initiate a sequence of cascading events. On the other hand, a large number of critical functionalities of the CPS require accurate information and measurements from the physical system. Failures of sensors, devices and communication lines lead to incomplete data, delays in computing and failures to deliver important commands. Consequently, the reliability of the physical system is compromised.

2.1. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System

For on-line operation and monitoring of the critical infrastructures, SCADA systems have been deployed in various industries, such as power, oil and gas, transportation and manufacturing. Abnormal operating conditions of a power system can be detected from a remote location through a SCADA system. Thus, the response time to correct an abnormal condition is reduced. In addition, utilities can reduce routine and emergency visits of field crews to remote sites. Figure 1 shows the major parts of a SCADA system: (1) sensors and control devices; (2) the digital communication system; (3) human machine interface (HMI); and (4) software (e.g., EMS/DMS). In the power industry, SCADA systems are used for collecting measurements by current transformers (CTs) and voltage transformers (VTs) and sending control commands to switching devices (e.g., circuit breakers).

Figure 1. Architecture of a SCADA system.

The set of SCADA data at remote sites is sent to the control center via WAN (e.g., radio, satellite and Internet). As a result, the data will be delivered through the LAN in a control center. Devices connected to the LAN in a control center can access the data. In remote sites, sensors (e.g., current and voltage sensors) are connected to PLCs or RTUs via copper wires directly. If the substation uses an RTU or PLC as a gateway, there is no LAN at remote sites. Thus, the SCADA network indicates that the LAN is utilized for passing SCADA data. Remote terminal units (RTUs) and programmable logic controllers (PLCs) serve as a gateway to provide the connection between electronic devices at remote sites and an IP-based SCADA system. Although RTU and PLC have overlapping functions on remote control and monitoring, RTUs are usually deployed for wide geographic telemetry, whereas PLCs are used for local area control [5].

EMS and DMS are the software systems in control centers at the transmission and distribution level, respectively. Both of them are used to perform the monitoring, control and analysis functions in a power system. EMS provides functionalities, such as: (1) contingency analysis; (2) state estimation; and (3) optimal power flow. The primary functionalities of DMS include: (1) acquiring customer data (e.g., power consumption and personal data) through smart meters and/or SCADA (only measurements); and (2) outage management.

Cyber vulnerabilities that exist in the SCADA systems are discussed in [6]. Through remote access points of a communication system, attackers may be able to disrupt communications, monitor system status, access critical data (e.g., operating plan, the topology of installed protection systems, passwords and measurement records), inject malicious control commands and inject falsified data into a control center. These actions can mislead system operators into taking inappropriate operations. Specific vulnerabilities in SCADA networks and EMS have been reported in [7,8]. Utilities should conduct vulnerability assessments regularly for securing their system. Specific approaches to the identification of vulnerabilities are reported in [9,10]. To assess the vulnerability in communication systems, an integrated risk assessment method is proposed for both physical and cyber systems [11]. Every security event is assigned with a probability value. A vulnerability index is calculated based on the cause-effect relationship between a cyber intrusion event and the power grid. It is used to quantify the degree of cyber security risk in an SCADA system. The probability of each security event affects the value of the vulnerability index. Another study of the vulnerability is performed by utilizing detailed models of the SCADA system [12]. Vulnerabilities are investigated at three levels: (1) systems; (2) scenarios; and (3) access points. In this research, the physical and cyber system models, as well as the model of intrusion behavior (i.e., scenario level) and access points (e.g., firewall, virtual private network, dial-up connection, wireless and other remote logon applications) are included. The result of the evaluation is the total loss of load that can be caused by a cyber attack in a power system and the power system’s proximity to a collapse point, leading to a major outage.

2.2. PMU

The data scanning rate of an EMS is 2 to 5 s with unsynchronized measurement signals. Voltage angles of each bus cannot be measured directly by the current SCADA systems; they are obtained by power flow calculation or state estimation. To enable direct measurements of the voltage angles, the first set of experimental PMUs was developed at Virginia Tech in 1988, and the commercial PMU products were initially built by Macrodyne in 1992. PMUs have an extremely high sampling rate from 30 to 120 samples per second [13]. With the high accuracy of the timing pulse (less than one microsecond) of the global positioning system (GPS), the data can be aligned on each time frame. The large amount of synchronized data can be used to improve the on-line monitoring of power system dynamics, including voltage stability, small signal ability and transient stability [14-16].A phasor data concentrator (PDC) serves as a gateway in the phasor network. Local PDCs are installed in substations for collecting the PMU information and forwarding the data to the PDC in a control center. The data are used for further static and dynamic analysis. Similar to cyber vulnerabilities in SCADA systems, attackers may hack into the phasor network to monitor or inject false data. In addition, PMUs use the GPS signal from satellites. Attackers may create abnormal operating conditions on a power grid by jamming or spoofing GPS signals [17,18].

2.3. Substation Automation System

Traditional electronic devices at substations have been upgraded to IEDs, such as protective IEDs, merging units (MUs) and intelligent controllers. In addition to the functions of conventional electronic devices (e.g., protective relays, CTs and VTs), IEDs provide the digital communication with a remote control center. The Working Group (WG) 10 of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Technical Committee (TC) 57 proposed the concept of SASs. As a result, utilities gradually adopted the IEC 61850 standard for the design of SASs [19]. The characteristics of IEC 61850 are summarized:

(1)Reducing the cost of installation and engineering:

IEDs are connected to a local area network (LAN) in a substation via Ethernet-based communication. Hence, copper cables are replaced by communication lines (e.g., optical fibers and Ethernet cables) that offer higher transmission rates. All data and control commands can be transmitted using a single communication line, leading to a reduced cost.

(2)Enhancing interoperability of IEDs:

All IEC 61850-based devices (e.g., IEDs) are able to import/export the substation configuration language (SCL) file, which contains device information from/to a server via the ICT network. With the auto-configured feature, IEDs of different vendors can be adopted in the same substation without a compatibility issue.

(3)Minimizing the impact of a change in topology:

Substation engineers can connect/disconnect IEDs into the existing SAS. Through the ICT network, engineers can send the SCL files to all on-line IEDs for reconfiguration at the same time.

Since most power substations are unmanned, operators use remote control technologies to access the substation communication network (SCN). The architecture of an SCN is illustrated in Figure 2. Once an attacker explores approaches (e.g., cracking the password) to access a SCN, (s)he gains access to the critical data (e.g., system topology and operating plans, measurements, maintenance records and the status of circuit breakers) and is able to send control commands (e.g., opening circuit breakers). Attackers can access multiple substations at the same time if the communication system is vulnerable. The worst case is that an attacker triggers a sequence of cascading events on a power system causing a wide area blackout.

Figure 2. Architecture of an IEC 61850 based substation.

For the purpose of a secure SAS network, several guidelines have been published. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) developed critical infrastructure protection (CIP) standards CIP-002 through CIP-009 for “providing a cyber security framework for the identification and protection of critical cyber assets to support reliable operation of the bulk electric system” [20]. NISTIR 7628, guidelines for smart grid cyber security, was proposed by NIST [4,21]. In addition, the Energy Sector Control Systems Working Group (ESCSWG) published the document, “Roadmap to Achieve Energy Delivery System Cyber Security” for improving the cyber security of energy delivery systems [22].

2.4. AMI

An advanced metering system is a customer-side technology for smart grids. Smart meters lead to a new relationship between power consumers and providers. Conventional meters (i.e., mechanical meters and digital meters) are used to record the power usage for billing purposes. Smart meters are able to record both energy flows in and out of a house. With smart meters, consumers can also become producers by installing roof-top solar panels and/or small wind generators. Moreover, electric vehicles can be an energy resource by restoring energy when electricity prices are low and injecting power back to the grid when electricity prices go up. The digital communication system opens the door to make load demand more flexible.

A smart meter has several components, i.e., current and voltage sensors, digital communication module, data storage unit, microprocessor and RAM. Smart meters are installed on the customer side. Thus, the device can be more vulnerable than other utility side facilities in a power grid. Since smart meters record detailed usage information of the clients, attackers may be able to access users’ private information in addition to stealing electricity [23-25].

A smart meter also serves as a controller and a router in a home area network (HAN). Based on the vision of the Internet of Things (IoT), home appliances can be connected to the Internet and controlled by smart phones via the Internet. Smart meters are ideal devices as a controller because they support wireless communication [26]. In a wireless communication environment, appliances can be added/removed in a HAN without wiring and configuring issues. Currently, most smart meters are designed to use the ZigBee communication protocol defined in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [27]. ZigBee has a communication distance limit because the technology is designed for electronic devices with low power consumption. Unlike Wi-Fi technology using a star topology, ZigBee support devices are connected in a meshed network where data can be exchanged between end-devices. Therefore, the transmission distance can be extended by hopping among devices in the same LAN. The communication structure of an AMI network is shown in Figure 3. A connected grid router (CGR) collects meter data in a neighborhood. Several communication links pass the data from end points to the CGR. Commands from a control center propagate in reserve direction from the CGR to the control target. If any of the meters in the middle of a linkage go off-line, the link topology will be automatically reconfigured by a preset plan. However, computer viruses or malicious application programs can also be spread in an AMI network in a short time, since meters can communicate with each other. Thus, many cyber security studies on AMI focus on the security of communication protocols and secured communication structures [28-30]. NIST and user groups, such as the Open Smart Grid, have produced reports and enacted requirements to ensure that manufacturers and policy makers incorporate cyber security from the beginning of the development process. These documents range from risk assessment [31,32] to security requirements [4].

Figure 3. Architecture of an AMI system.

2.5. Overview

Except for the SCADA system, PMU, SAS and AMI belong to the smart grid. “Smart” means that the data can be sent/received through the digital communication system. In the SCADA system, measurements collected by gateways (e.g., PLCs or RTUs) are provided by sensors and transmitted via copper wires. Although the digital communication system is utilized by PLCs or RTUs for transmitting data to the control center, the communication between sensors and gateways remains traditional. Therefore, SCADA does not belong to smart grid technologies.

Communication protocols define the digital data formats and rules for telecommunication. With respect to different requirements (e.g., latency, security and packet size) of communication systems, different communication protocols are utilized. The latest version of the communication protocols in power systems is listed in Table 1. In addition, vulnerability assessment approaches of the subsystems (i.e., SCADA, PMU, SAS and AMI) of power grids are provided. The information of vulnerability studies has been tabulated in Table 2.

Table 1. Latest version of communication protocols.

Table 2. Overview of SCADA, PMU, SAS and AMI.

3. Cyber Intrusion Protection Systems

As a packet filter, the firewall serves as the front-line defense for a protection system. Packets that fulfil the user-defined rules can pass firewalls. Anomaly events (e.g., unknown IP connection, IP scanning and port scanning) are recorded in a log file. However, firewalls only examine the lower layer communication information (i.e., network layer). Therefore, malicious code cannot be detected in the higher layer of the communication structure (i.e., application layer). Thus, except for firewalls, various types of IDSs and ADSs have been proposed to capture abnormal behaviors towards the communication system.

IDSs are used to detect intrusion behaviors in power systems. After receiving an intrusion alarm from IDSs, operators can take a control strategy to mitigate the impact of cyber attacks. In addition to the functions of IDSs, intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPSs) can apply a control strategy to the cyber attack with an appropriate mitigation method directly. Therefore, IDPSs respond to cyber attacks (before/after) faster than IDSs. The impact on a power system is reduced further.

3.1. Types of IDSs

A smart grid is an integration of both physical and cyber systems. The physical system consists of power generation units, substations and transmission and distribution systems, while the cyber system represents the digital communication system (e.g., ICT network) and SCADA system. The principles behind the design of IDSs for cyber and physical systems are very different.

3.1.1. Network-Based IDSs

A network-based IDS (NIDS) monitors the network traffic in a LAN. Through a physical network interface card connected to the LAN, an NIDS gains access to all network flows in a network segment. NIDS checks for anomalies by inspecting the contents and header information of all packets passing through the network segment. Each communication protocol has a uniquely-defined format and structure of network packets. As a result, anomalies can be recognized by comparing predefined rules with abnormal packets [33,34].

3.1.2. Host-Based IDSs

A host-based IDS (HIDS) is installed in one or more data servers individually. The primary task of an HIDS is to identify anomalies among measurements and the status of physical devices. A HIDS also has a set of user-defined rules that describe the normal behavior among the devices. For example, if a circuit breaker is opened without a detected fault signal, the HIDS will consider this event as an anomaly. Thus, a HIDS utilizes log files recorded by physical equipment, such as IEDs, PMUs and firewalls [35]. The architecture of NIDS and HIDS in a substation is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Architecture of an SCN with network-based IDS (NIDS) and host-based IDS (HIDS) installed.

3.2. Detection Systems and Mitigation Techniques in Smart Grids

3.2.1. Detection Systems

Blacklists and whitelists are two typical detection approaches. A comparison is shown in Table 3. Anti-virus applications for personal computers are good examples that use the blacklist. A virus can be recognized by comparing its signature with records in a database. If the signature is matched, the virus will be quarantined or deleted. In contrast, an example of the whitelist detection system is the access to a control system, which utilizes a database to record the information of authorized users. Database rules must be updated frequently for both whitelist and blacklist detection systems. Otherwise, the latest anomalies would not be recognized by the detection system. Similarly, the whitelist detection system needs to be updated so that it allows the newly-authenticated operations to be conducted.

Table 3. A comparison of the detection methods.

Intrusion detection technologies have been explored in the ICT environment. However, attack vectors, vulnerability, availability requirements and interactions between physical and cyber domains are new challenges to power systems. Several studies of IDSs for the power grid have been reported. A list of IDSs is shown in Table 4.

Table 4. IDSs for the smart grid.

Most IDSs are either host-based or network-based. However, a hybrid IDS has a higher performance in a CPS. For this purpose, an integrated ADS for substation cyber security is proposed [45]. The host-based anomaly detection inspects temporal anomalies in the substation facilities. Meanwhile, multicast messages (e.g., GOOSE and SMV) are monitored by the network-based anomaly detection. Cyber attacks can be identified by correlating the information from both parts of anomaly detection systems (ADSs). In Section 4 of this paper, a test example of the integrated ADS in the Smart City Testbed (SCT) is presented.

3.2.2. Mitigation Techniques

The primary task of mitigation actions is to ensure the reliability and stability of a power system. Mitigation actions are activated as soon as IDSs or IDPSs report an attack event. In general, mitigation methods include two parts, cyber and physical systems. For the cyber system, the mitigation techniques are aimed at verifying the legitimacy of on-line users and network packets. For the physical system, the mitigation control strategies are applied to maintain the stability of power systems. If attacks affect the stability of power systems, control strategies must be applied. A mitigation framework and control strategies of generators are proposed in [46] to maintain system stability with respect to switching attacks. In the study of [47], both cyber and physical mitigation steps are included. Unknown on-line users will either be suspended or have very limited manipulation privileges. Another mitigation technique reported in [48] is used against the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. DNP 3.0 is a common communication protocol for SCADA systems. By utilizing a packet retransmission strategy [49], the authors suggested that the MITM can be prevented.

3.3. Detection Systems of AMI Network

In [50], it is reported that the number of installed smart meters in the U.S. has reached 65 million by 2015. The deployment of smart meters is a continuing trend in the power industry. A cyber security issue for smart meters is energy theft, e.g., an attacker modifies the values of energy consumption readings. Several detection systems have been developed against energy theft [51-54]. Through monitoring load profiles, detection systems are able to recognize anomalies, such as the drastic change of power usage at a specific time instant and unusual power usage patterns. Another purpose of detection systems [55-57] is to secure the communication and avoid information leakage. Authorization, authentication and encryption technologies are applied to enhance the security of private information. Most research on the AMI cyber security is focused on: (1) energy theft; and (2) information security (i.e., power usage and false data injection). As smart meters have limited computational capability, detection systems should be designed with a low computational burden [55]. The practical implementation of smart meters with the capability of IDSs is still limited.

4. CPS Testbeds

Researchers investigate potential cyber vulnerabilities in the smart grid. In doing so, it is risky to perform cyber security studies on a real power system. Therefore, a real-time CPS testbed serves as a feasible alternative since it can capture interactions among cyber-control-physical subsystems. A CPS testbed has several advantages: (1) power system simulation tools (e.g., Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS), DIgSILENT, PowerWorld, TSAT and PSS®E) can simulate the response of a large-scale power system with a reasonable level of accuracy; (2) a testbed can be focused on a specific security study area (e.g., distribution system, transmission system, SCADA system and AMI network); and (3) a testbed can be extended through connecting multiple testbeds via communications (e.g., Internet and LAN). Testbed-based research is important for areas such as: (1) vulnerability assessment; (2) impact analysis; and (3) attack-defense evaluation and validation.

4.1. National Level Testbed

The DOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) created a testbed program in 2008. A National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) has been established by collaboration among National Labs (i.e., Argonne, Idaho, Lawrence, Berkeley, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest and Sandia) for identifying and reducing existing cyber vulnerabilities in energy sectors (i.e., electric, oil and gas) and testing new and existing electronic devices that are used in energy industries [58-60]. To meet the objectives, the NSTB program invests in R&D for next-generation control systems, vulnerability assessment and risk analysis to enhance cyber security in energy systems, as well as physical grid components, including generation units and transmission systems to build a realistic testing environment. However, the substantial cost of physical infrastructures places limits on the development of these testbeds.

4.2. Testbed at Research Institutes

The cost of a national-level testbed is high. Several research centers have developed a smaller scale of CPS testbeds for different CPS security studies. A CPS testbed, Virtual Power System Testbed (VPST) [61], at the University of Illinois has the ability to simulate both cyber and physical systems by using a network integration tool based on the Illinois-developed Real-Time Immersive Network Simulation Environment (RINSE) and a power system simulator (i.e., PowerWorld and RTDS). Except for performing cyber-physical security studies, this testbed also shows the interconnectivity between multiple testbeds. The framework of inter-testbed connector (ITC) was proposed for reducing the complexity of the testbed configuration.

The Cyber Security testbed at University College Dublin (UCD) is intended for the cyber security study of the SCADA system. The testbed consists of four parts: (1) a commercial EMS is used in the SCADA system network; (2) IEC 61850 communication formed the SCN in simulated substations; (3) a power system simulation tool (i.e., DIgSILENT) is used to simulate a power system; and (4) the Object Linking and Embedding for Process Control (OPC) communication protocol bridges the physical and cyber domains [62].

With the effort of previous research project (i.e., Internet-Scale Event and Attack Generation Environment (ISEAGE)) at Iowa State University (ISU) [63], the PowerCyber Security testbed is able to perform the wide area network emulation and advanced attack simulation. Both hardware-based (RTDS) and software-based (DIgSILENT) power system simulation tools support the real-time and off-line system simulation. With respect to advanced virtualization technologies, the cost of development can be reduced and the scalability of testbeds can be addressed.

A number of CPS testbeds have been developed for the study of cyber security issues of power systems. However, most of them are not public. Researchers from the University of Southern California and University of California, Berkeley, emphasize the existence of a significant gap between defense mechanisms and attack techniques. In order to accelerate the development of cyber protection systems, a plan is proposed to involve more researchers to work together. The defense technology experimental research (DETER) project [64-66] started in March 2004. It provides a public platform that allows researchers to share data, tools, configurations of the testbed and applications. In addition, it helps researchers start new projects with the results of completed experiments and test cases.

4.3. SCT at Washington State University

4.3.1. Configuration of the SCT

A comprehensive testbed for the simulation of cyber-power systems has been developed at Washington State University [67]. The architecture of SCT is shown in Figure 5. Unlike other testbeds that focus on some subsystems, SCT is a hardware-in-the-loop testbed that covers from the control center level all the way to smart meters at the customer level. The transmission system, distribution system, DER and AMI are also included. The physical system components of the SCT include protective IEDs, feeder protection relays, smart meters and data collectors. DNP 3.0, IEC 61850, ANSI C12.19 and IEEE C37.118 formed the communication network protocols. EMS and DMS are available to simulate the operations at a transmission control center and a distribution operation center, respectively. The functions of EMS (such as contingency analysis, state estimation and optimal power flow) are used to study the impact of cyber intrusion on a power system. The DMS can import the real-time customer data (e.g., power usage) collected by smart meters installed on the WSU campus. Other smart meters are installed in the lab for research purpose. These meters will be used to study cyber intrusions into the AMI network with the meter data management system. As several power system physical devices are deployed, the SCT is a realistic model of the real-world environment. Compared to the national level testbed, SCT uses software models for transmission lines, circuit breakers, substations and generators. The characteristics of the SCT includes: (1) a realistic software-hardware simulation environment; (2) several communication and control devices are implemented; (3) different combinations of physical configuration can be tested for identifying cyber security leakages; and (4) the impact of cyber attacks on the entire power system can be investigated from transmission, distribution to the customer level.

Figure 5. SCT at WSU.

4.3.2. Test Case

A cyber attack scenario is demonstrated on the SCT using the IEEE 39-bus system. The integrated ADS proposed in [45] is applied to and validated by the same scenario. For the cyber attack, it is assumed that attackers have full knowledge to access the communication systems in multiple substations. Attackers are able to send modified GOOSE packets to trip all circuit breakers on targeted substations.

In the first scenario, the targets are selected as Substations 38, 32, 35 and 33. Note that the most valuable targets are the buses connected to generators directly. The attack starts at t = 3 s. One substation is compromised every 3 s. The last target (i.e., Substation 33) is compromised at t = 12 s. The attack sequence and the target information are listed in Table 5. During the attack, over-current relays report that circuit breakers are opened without sensing an over-current condition. In Figure 6, the targeted substations are depicted in the one-line diagram of the IEEE 39-bus system. After four generators connected to the targeted substations are disconnected, a cascading sequence of events is triggered, since the power system loses a significant portion of generation capability. A wide area outage occurs at the last stage. The load and generation levels of the IEEE 39-bus system are shown in Table 6. Generators cannot provide sufficient MW power to serve the load after the cyber attack. Dynamic simulation results of the cyber attack are shown in Figure 7.

Figure 6. One-line diagram of IEEE 39-bus system. The targeted substations and generators are marked in blue.
Figure 7. Dynamic simulation results.

Table 5. Attack sequence and the information of targets.

Table 6. Load and generation data of the IEEE 39-bus system.

In the second scenario, the proposed integrated ADS [45] is deployed with the same cyber attack scenario. The HMI of ADS that shows the number of detected anomaly packets is shown in Figure 8. Note that a small number of modified packets is not detected due to the extremely high packet rate. In the meantime, protection IEDs await the confirmation signal from ADS when falsified packets are received. Since an abnormal behavior has been detected, ADS sends a signal to lockout the circuit breaker. Thus, all circuit breakers remain closed during the cyber attack. The proposed ADS has been validated by the SCT.

Figure 8. Implementation of the proposed ADS in a substation.
5. Conclusions

The extensive deployment of ICT systems transforms traditional power grids into smart grids. The increasing connectivity also creates cyber security vulnerabilities. As a result, CPS security has become a critical issue for the smart grid. In this paper, the state-of-the-art of vulnerability assessment for CPSs is conducted with a focus on the impact of cyber intrusion. New vulnerabilities may be derived from the system reconfiguration and/or upgrade. Therefore, vulnerability assessment should be conducted on a regular basis, particularly after a system reconfiguration. As an alternative to testing on the actual cyber-power system, a testbed provides a substitute for the impact analysis of cyber attacks. A testbed should have the capability to mimic the behaviors of real systems. Reliable and accurate simulation tools (software and hardware) of the power and communication systems are needed to provide a realistic cyber-power system environment.

Various types of ADSs and IDSs have been proposed to monitor the cyber-power system behaviors. The design of detection systems should meet the requirements of power systems, such as transmission delay and system performance. An over-designed detection system that bears a high computational burden may reduce the performance of both power system and detection system.

In December 2015, cyber attackers compromised multiple substations likely by utilizing the malware “BlackEnergy” installed in computers of the control center. During the attack, attackers launched the flooding attack on the telephone system and, as a result, customers were not able to report the event to the utility. This fact allowed attackers to compromise a larger number of substations. The falsified SCADA dataset was injected into the control center. Therefore, the operators were not aware that the system was de-energized. Due to this cyber attack, over 80,000 customers experienced power outage. This incident is a cyber attack that caused a direct impact on a power system. IDSs and IDPSs are used to analyze abnormal events in both cyber and physical systems. Even if attackers pass the identity check, alarms will be triggered once abnormal behaviors are detected in the physical system. It is shown that a cyber system’s breach of the substation security can open a pathway to allow cyber attackers to access the substation communication network and impact physical systems.

Acknowledgments

This material is based on work supported by the Department of Energy under Award Number DE-OE0000780. The views and opinions of the authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:

ADSAnomaly detection system
AGCAutomatic generator control
AMIAdvanced metering infrastructure
AT&TAmerican Telephone and Telegraph Company
CGRConnected grid router
CIPCritical infrastructure protection
CPSCyber-physical system
CTCurrent transformer
DERDistributed energy resources
DETERDefense technology experimental research
DMSDistribution management system
DNPDistributed network protocol
EMSEnergy management system
ESCSWGEnergy Sector Control Systems Working Group
GOOSEGeneric object-oriented substation event
GPSGlobal positioning system
HANHome area network
HMIHuman machine interface
ICTInformation and communications technology
IDPSIntrusion detection and prevention system
IDSIntrusion detection system
IECInternational Electrotechnical Commission
IEDIntelligent electronic device
INLIdaho National Laboratory
IoTInternet of things
IPInternet Protocol
ISEAGEInternet-scale event and attack generation environment
ISUIowa State University
ITCInter-testbed connector
LANLocal area network
MUMerging unit
MVARMega volt-ampere reactive
MWMega Watt
NERCNorth American Electric Reliability Corporation
NISTNational Institute for Standards and Technology
NISTIRNIST Internal or Interagency Report
NSTBNational SCADA test bed
OPCObject linking and embedding for process control
OSGPOpen smart grid protocol
PDCPhasor data concentrator
PG&EPacific Gas and Electric Company
PLCProgrammable logic controller
PMUPhasor measurement unit
RINSEReal-time immersive network simulation environment
RTDSReal-time digital simulator
RTURemote terminal unit
SASSubstation automation system
SCADASupervisory control and data acquisition
SCLSubstation configuration language
SCNSubstation communication network
SCTSmart City Testbed
SMVSample measured value
TCIPGTrustworthy cyber infrastructure for the power grid
UCDUniversity College Dublin
VTVoltage transformer
WAMSWide area measurement system
WANWide area network
WiMAXWorldwide interoperability for microwave access
WSUWashington State University

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Article Source: Electronics 2016, 5(3), 40; https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics5030040, https://www.mdpi.com/2079-9292/5/3/40/htm

How reliable are transformer energy efficiency tests (including Independent 3rd Party) under non-linear loading?

Published by Mirus International Inc., [2010-01-08] MIRUS-FAQ001-B2, FAQ’s Harmonic Mitigating Transformers, 31 Sun Pac Blvd., Brampton, Ontario, Canada. L6S 5P6.


It is much more difficult to accurately determine the energy efficiency of a transformer under non-linear loading than it is under linear loading. The industry accepted technique for measuring transformer efficiency under linear load involves measuring losses using Open Circuit and Short Circuit Tests. The Open Circuit or No-load Test measures core losses (iron losses). The Short Circuit Test or Load Test measures load losses which are also called I2R losses or copper losses. This allows for calculation of Transformer Efficiency = Output Power / (Output Power + Total Losses). This calculation is equivalent to Efficiency = Output Power / Input Power but produces more accurate and repeatable results.

The example below shows how very accurate efficiency calculations can be achieved by measuring losses directly even with a relatively inaccurate power meter (+/- 1.0%).

True Output Power = 97 kW
True Input Power = 100 kW, Losses = 3 kW
True Efficiency = 97 / 100 or 97%.

Measuring losses directly with a +/- 1.0% power meter yields a measurement error of only +/- 0.03% as follows:

Output Power = 97kW
Measured Losses = 3kW – (0.01 x 3 kW) = 2.97 kW
Efficiency = 97/ (97 + 2.97) = 97 / 99.97 = 97.03%

Unfortunately this method of directly measuring the losses themselves inherently applies only to transformer operation with a linear load. For non-linear load we must revert to a much less accurate method of calculating efficiency based upon direct measurements of Output and Input Power. This method will only produce acceptable results if measurements are taken simultaneously by two highly accurate power meters.

An example of how output power vs input power measurements using meters of average measurement accuracy (ie. +/- 0.5%) can produce misleading results is shown below. The earlier example is used but this time measuring input and output power with a meter of +/- 0.5% accuracy (better than previous +/- 1.0%).

Measured Output Power = 97kW + 0.5kW = 97.5 kW
Measured Input Power = 100kW – 0.5kW = 99.5kW
Calculated Efficiency = 97.5 / 99.5 = 98%, a full 1% error despite measurement accuracy within +/- 0.5%.

This results in a reported 98% efficiency for a transformer that is truly only 97%. Similarly, the calculated result could have been 96% if the errors were reversed. To emphasis the significance of this error, reporting 98% on a transformer that is actually 97% means losses are under reported by a full 1/3 (ie. 2% losses instead of 3%). The measurements are essentially useless. This inaccuracy is magnified further if only one meter is used because even a very small change in the load power between measurements will very dramatically affect the results.

To provide truly accurate and reliable transformer efficiency measurements under non-linear loading, Mirus has built a Non-linear Load Test facility, known as the Harmonics & Energy or H&E Lab, at its manufacturing facility near Toronto (see Figure 16-1).

Figure 16-1: H&E Lab showing Non-linear Load Bank

The H&E Non-linear Load Bank has the capability of loading transformers up to 225 kVA to their full load rating. Larger transformers can be loaded proportionately (ie. 500 kVA to 45% load). This is believed to be the largest 120V phase-to-neutral non-linear load bank of any transformer manufacturer, including all other HMT manufacturers.

In order to achieve the most accurate measurements possible, the H&E Lab is equipped with two revenue class digital power meters with an accuracy of 0.1% and current transformers with 0.3% accuracy. The meters can measure up to the 63rd harmonic. One meter is used to connect to the transformer primary while the second meter is connected to the transformer secondary. To further improve measurement accuracy, efficiency calculations are based on kW-sec totalization rather than on instantaneous kW readings in order to minimize any sample timing error.

Figure 16-2: Metering Console equipped with 2 x PML ION 7500 Digital Meters

The Non-linear Load Bank in the H&E Lab consists of several Variable Frequency Drives fed with 1-phase power. When supplied with 1-phase power, the 3-phase diode bridge rectifier of a VFD draws current which has a waveform and harmonic spectrum that is representative of a very high K-factor, 1-phase non-linear load similar to that of computer power supplies and other power electronic equipment connected phase-to-neutral.

Figure 16-3: Sample of H&E Lab Non-linear Load Bank current profile on testing of a 45kVA transformer at 100% and 50% loading.

A sample of the typical load profile of the Non-linear Load Bank is shown in Figure 16-3. In this example, a 45 kVA transformer was operated at both 100% and 50% loading. At full load, secondary current was 129A with a K-factor of just over 9 and current total harmonic distortion (Ithd) of 81%. At 50% load, the K-factor increased to over 13 with Ithd > 90%.

In summary, claims of highly accurate transformer testing under non-linear loading by any party should not be accepted without reviewing their complete test procedure and full test report including documentation on measurement techniques and certified instrumentation accuracy. This is particularly important if testing was performed with a single power meter because it would be impossible to take measurements simultaneously..


Harmonics and Harmonic Mitigating Transformers (HMT’s) Questions and Answers

This document has been written to provide answers to the more frequently asked questions we have received regarding harmonics and the Harmonic Mitigating Transformer technology used to address them. This information will be of interest to both those experienced in harmonic mitigation techniques and those new to the problem of harmonics. For additional information visit our Website at www.mirusinternational.com.

Real Time Sustainable Power Quality Analysis of Non-Linear Load under Symmetrical Conditions

Published by Pavan Babu Bandla 1, Indragandhi Vairavasundaram 1, Yuvaraja Teekaraman 2, Ramya Kuppusamy 3 and Srete Nikolovski 4,*

1School of Electrical Engineering, Vellore Institute of Technology, Vellore 632014, India
2MOBI-Mobility, Logistics and Automotive Technology Research Centre, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
3Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Sri Sairam College of Engineering, Bangalore 562106, India
4Power Engineering Department, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Computer Science and Information Technology, University of Osijek, 31000 Osijek, Croatia
*Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.


Abstract

Voltage sag is one of the most significant power quality problems in the industry and has a significant impact on induction motor safety and stability. This paper analyzes the characteristics of voltage dips in power systems and induction motors with a special emphasis on balanced dips with the help of virtual grids (regenerative grid simulator), as per IEC 61000-4-11. Three phase induction motors with 3.3 kW, 16 A coupled to a DC generator with 3.7 kW, and 7.8 A rated are considered for the test analysis. This paper aids in the development of an induction motor to achieve improved precision by taking different voltage sags into account. The experimental results benefit the design modifications of induction motors at industrial and other commercial levels of consumers regarding major power quality issues and the behavior of the induction motors. A proposed modification employing ANSYS is provided to further examine the precise performance of induction motors during sag events.

Keywordspower quality; voltage sag; induction motor; grid emulator; ANSYS

1. Introduction

Voltage sags are thought to be responsible for between 92–98 percent of all outages caused by power supply problems [1]. As a result, it’s critical to precisely analyze the impact of voltage sags. In the conventional sag characterization technique, voltage sags are characterized by their magnitude and duration. During the sag, the magnitude is defined as a percentage of the remaining voltage (as shown in Figure 1). The duration of the sag in this example is the time between the start and end of the sag. In recent years, one of the most critical concerns that electrical engineers have been aware of is power quality. Various power quality issues, such as voltage sags, voltage distortions, voltage imbalances, and voltage fluctuations, are frequent in power systems, wreaking havoc on generators, transformers, and industrial and home loads [2,3]. The induction motor is one of the most common industrial loads that are affected by power quality issues. Using low-quality voltage to power induction motors results in additional losses, overheating, and a drop in efficiency.

Figure 1. Voltage sag.

Voltage sag is a common occurrence in transmission and distribution systems [4]. Short circuits, overloads, or the starting of powerful motors cause voltage sag, which is a short-term drop in the root mean square (RMS) voltage. Voltage sags are gaining popularity as a result of their negative impact on sensitive equipment. Even if the voltage dips below 90% of the specified voltage for more than a few cycles, such equipment can trip. Furthermore, voltage sags are caused by faults that occur hundreds of kilometers away [5-8]. Even if the voltage sag is not as severe as an interruption, the overall damage caused by sags is larger than that caused by interruptions since there are much more voltage sags than interruptions.

2. Methodology to Test the Sag Conditions Analysis of Sag Conditions

2.1. Regenerative Grid Simulator

A regenerative grid simulator may be used to modify essential parameters in order to replicate a reliable distribution grid/network conditions and settings, as illustrated in Figure 2. In single and three phase modes, variations in voltage amplitude, frequency, voltage dips, and phase angle are all maintained [9-12]. Simulating balanced and unbalanced situations (three phases) is simple. This simulator also satisfies IEC regulatory requirements 61000-4-11, which is a requirement for the AC supply [13-15]. The measurement accuracy of the Regenerative Grid Simulator are: Voltage—0.2% + 0.2% F.S, Current (RMS)—0.4% + 0.3% F, Current (Peak)—0.4% + 0.6% F.S, and Power—0.4% + 0.4% F.S.

Figure 2. Voltage sag testing setup.

2.2. Computer Control

The graphical user interface (GUI) was created with the goal of making the regenerative grid simulator setup as easy as possible. The soft panel (GUI) is installed in a computer that also has data recording functions, allowing many measurements to be reported and saved at the same time.

2.3. Load

For the distribution network, there are three phases—3.3 kW, 16 A with a DC generator as a load with 3.7 kW, and a 7.8 A induction motor are connected. There is also a power analyzer/fluke, since electronic power conversion designs should have high accuracy measurements to analyze and explain the incremental efficiency gains in devices.

2.4. Measurement

A power analyzer or fluke was formerly used to take accurate measurements and display repeated oscilloscope and particular shot events, like turn on and transients. The Oscilloscope utilized was different. The measurement setup’s complexity and configuration time are both decreased. The measurement accuracy for the power analyzer are: basic accuracy (50/60 Hz)—0.05% of reading and best power accuracy (50/60 Hz)—0.1% of reading.

2.5. Test Process

One of four types of communication interfaces (GPIB, RS232, USB, and LAN) is chosen initially for communication between the PC and the AC source. The communication protocol is entered into the main window after it is set. The voltage and frequency parameters, as well as the sinusoidal output waveform, should all be set to the proper values. Phase edit selection can be used to adjust the output voltage in three phases for ease of usage. Various power quality tests may be performed in the PC window, with the results being recorded using the power analyzer.

3. Analysis of Sag Conditions

Figure 3 represents the hardware experimental setup for analyzing the single-phase sag in one of three phases, and symmetrical voltage sags in an induction motor at different stages.

Figure 3. Experimental setup.

3.1. Regenerative Grid Supply with Voltage Sag

In order to meet the Micro Grid test standards, the 61,800 Regenerative Grid Simulator can simulate various test scenarios such as voltage distortion, frequency fluctuations, and so on. Most crucially, the 61,800 series product’s regenerative functionality allows it to absorb power generated by the Discrete Generator (DG) on the micro grid and feed it back to the main grid as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Voltage sag conditions in grid.

Figure 5 represents the voltage sag created in the regenerative simulator as per the IEC-61000 std through the soft panel. These sags are tested under 40%, 70%, and 80% dips, which are created and repeated a number of times in order to assess the behavior.

Figure 5. Voltage sag of (a) 40%, (b) 70%, and (c) 80%.

3.2. Induction Motor under Voltage Sag

Figure 6 represents the test setup of the DC generator-coupled induction motor when subjected to a single-phase sag in one of the three phases of the AC supply, which was created in the regenerative grid simulator. The tested results under loaded conditions with and without neutral connection are tabulated in Table 1 and Table 2.

Figure 6. Voltage sag conditions in grid connected to induction motor under no load.

Table 1. Induction motor under loaded conditions [neutral connected].

Table 2. Induction motor under loaded conditions [neutral not connected].

Figure 7 and Figure 8 represent the THD values of the current and voltage of the induction motor, respectively, during the single-phase sag conditions (neutrally connected) under no load conditions. Figure 9 and Figure 10 represent the same motor under the same conditions, but under loaded conditions.

Figure 7. Current THD of induction motor under no load conditions [neutral connected].
Figure 8. Voltage THD of induction motor under no load conditions [neutral connected].
Figure 9. Current THD of induction motor under loaded conditions [neutral connected].
Figure 10. Voltage THD of induction motor under loaded conditions [neutral connected].

3.3. Three Phase Sag

Generally balanced (symmetrical) voltage sags are caused by three-phase faults anywhere in the system for any short duration [16-19], as shown in Figure 11. In this approach, with the regenerative grid simulator, the three-phase sag is created and fed to the DC generator-coupled induction motor and is shown in Figure 12, Figure 13, Figure 14 and Figure 15. As discussed in Section 4, the test is carried out with neutral and without neutral connections under no load and full load conditions. The results obtained are tabulated in Table 3 and Table 4.

Figure 11. Voltage sag conditions in grid connected to induction motor under loaded conditions.
Figure 12. Voltage sag conditions in grid connected to induction motor under loaded conditions.
Figure 13. Voltage sag conditions in grid connected to induction motor under loaded conditions.
Figure 14. Voltage sag conditions in grid connected to induction motor under loaded conditions.
Figure 15. Voltage sag conditions in grid connected to induction motor under loaded conditions.

Table 3. Induction motor under loaded conditions [neutral not connected].

Table 4. IM-DC generator set under loaded conditions [neutral not connected].

Figure 16 represents the three-phase symmetrical voltage sag at 40%, 70%, and 80% when fed to a three phase—3.3 kW and 16 A with a DC generator as a load via a regenerative grid simulator. The measurement summaries are given below:

Figure 16. Grid connected to induction motor under loaded conditions with a sag of (a) 40%, (b) 70%, and (c) 80%

Voltage (Nominal): 239 V
Current (Nominal): 40 A
Frequency (Nominal): 50 Hz
Number of events: Normal: 2, Detailed: 12
Power measurement method: Unified
Type of cable: Copper
Harmonic scale: %H1
Mode of THD: THD 40
DPF mode/Cos φ: Cos φ

Table 5 represents the symmetrical sag test on a three phase, 415 V, 5 Hp, 7.8 A induction motor when delta connected under loaded conditions, and star connected under loaded conditions with and without neutral connections, respectively.

Table 5. Delta connected three-phase induction motor under loaded conditions.

Table 6 represents the results of star connected(non-neutral) three phase—7 kW, 7.8 A induction motor under loaded conditions, which are tested with a 40%, 70%, and 80% sag. Under 40% sag, the load can be maintained up to 2.8 kg, which leads to a huge rise of the line current. Under 70% sag, the load can be maintained up to 3 kg, which leads to a huge rise of the line current. Under 80% sag, the load can be maintained up to 3.2 kg, which leads to a huge rise of the line current.

Table 6. Star connected (non-neutral) three-phase induction motor under loaded conditions.

Table 7 represents the results of star connected (neutral) three phase—3.7 kW, 7.8 A induction motor under loaded conditions, which are tested with a 40%, 70%, and 80% sag. Under 40% sag, the load can be maintained up to 2.1 kg, which leads to a huge rise of the line current. Under 70% sag, the load can be maintained up to 2 kg, which leads to a huge rise of the line current. Under 80% sag, the load can be maintained up to 2.4 kg, which leads to a huge rise of the line current.

Table 7. Star connected (neutral) three-phase induction motor under loaded conditions.

4. Design Modifications of the Induction Motor Using ANSYS

The ANSYS is the most widely used tool in the industry for developing and analyzing electric motors. It enables for rapid and exact electromagnetic, thermal, and mechanical analysis of an electric machine over its complete operating range (Figure 17). This product was designed and manufactured in close collaboration with competent electric machine designers. This design carried out in the ANSYS simulation on the basis of the standard parameters of the induction motor and the properties of the modelled induction machine are mentioned below:

Figure 17. 3-D design of Stator and Rotor.

(a) Machine Geometry

Stator parameters
Slot Number: 18
Stator Lamination Diameter: 130
Stator Bore: 80
Width of Tooth: 7
Depth of Slot: 18
Tip depth of Tooth: 1
Slot opening: 3
Tip angle of Tooth: 30
Rotor Parameters
Rotor Bars: 26
Pole Number: 4
Bar opening and Depth [T]: 1.5
Bar Tip angle [T]: 20
Rotor Tooth Width [T]: 4
Bar Depth [T]: 10
Bar Connections Radius [T]:1.33
Air gap: 1
Shaft Dia: 25

(b) Input Data (Materials)

Figure 18 represents the database of the materials, which are mostly chosen, and an update of this database is also available. Below are the properties of the materials and the weights on which the cost estimates can be based if the price per unit is known.

Figure 18. Different material database for design.

(c) Machine Winding

Figure 19 represents the winding of the induction motor, and the properties are mentioned below:

Figure 19. Induction Motor Winding.

Lap winding: 50 turns
Throw: 4
Parallel paths: 1
Winding Layers: 2
Path type: Central

5. Simulation Results

For any motor type, the analytic single load point and no-load point tests are automatically computed. Torque speed/breakdown torque/locked rotor only AC mains (voltage driven) situations have characteristics/acceleration. Figure 20 represents the (a) speed vs. RMS current, (b) speed vs. torque, (c) speed vs. losses, and (d) speed vs. power characteristics of the induction motor with the suggested design modifications.

Figure 20. (a) Speed vs. RMS Current, (b) Speed vs. Torque, (c) Speed vs. Losses, and (d) Speed vs. Power.
6. Conclusions and Future Scope

This paper aids in the development of an induction motor to achieve improved precision by taking different voltage sags into account. Suggested modifications in the design parameters using ANSYS are provided to further examine the precise performance of induction motors during voltage sag events. Since balanced voltage sag is the major sag event, this study focuses solely on this mechanism. The experimental results benefit the design modifications of induction motors at industrial and other commercial levels of consumers regarding major power quality issues and behavior of the induction motors. This paper analyzes the characteristics of voltage dips in power systems and induction motors with a special emphasis on balanced dips, with the help of the virtual grid (regenerative grid simulator) as per IEC 61000-4-11. With regards to future study, the design modifications corresponding to each voltage sag process supports the industrial and other commercial levels of consumers.

Author Contributions: For the authors confirm contribution to the paper as follows: P.B.B.; study con conceptualization, design, and validation. I.V.; formal analysis, investigation, resources, and data curation. P.B.B.; writing—original draft and Simulation preparation. Y.T.; writing—review and editing. R.K. and S.N.; visualization and Supervision. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Article Source: Energies 2022, 15(1), 57; https://doi.org/10.3390/en15010057, https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/15/1/57/htm